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WRONGFUL DEATH WITHIN THE ADMIRALTY
JURISDICTION
CALVERT MAGRUDER AND MARSHALL GROUT
This topic has a two-fold interest, in that it emphasizes in
striking fashion some of the intricacies of our dual system of
state and federal jurisdiction, and involves, also, a consideration
of underlying theories of the conflict of laws. It is purposed in
this paper to deal generally with wrongful death, under the "gen-
eral maritime law", under the state death acts, and under the
Federal Death Act of 1920; and then to discuss separately the
special questions attendant upon the wrongful death of seamen.
I.
THE GENERAL MARITIME LAW
Since the decision of The Harrisburg' it has been unquestioned
that the "general maritime law" as understood and applied in
the United States, gave no right of action for wrongful death.2
It is fruitless now to inquire whether the court was not unduly
influenced by common law notions and whether the earlier de-
cision in The Seagull3 in which Chief Justice Chase, at circuit,
allowed the action, was not the preferable one.- It followed,
therefore, that in the absence of statute there was no recovery
'The Harrisburg (1886) 119 U. S. 199, 7 Sup. Ct. 140.
2 The Alaska (1889) 130 U. S. 201, 9 Sup. Ct. 461; The Wydale (1889,
C. C. E. Di La.) 37 Fed. 716; Fisher v. Boutelle Transportat ion Co. (1903,
E. D. Pa.) 162 Fed. 994; The Sagamore (1917, C. C. A. 1st) 247 Fed. 743;
Bloom v. Furness-Withy Co. (1923, S. D. Calif.) 293 Fed. 93.
3 (1867, C. C. D. Ald.) Chase's Dec. 145, followed in Hollyday v. The
David Reeves (1879, D. C. Md.) 5 Hughes, 89. See also Tiffany, Death by
Wrongfud Act (2d ed. 1913) Sec. 204.
4 See Phillemore, J., in Davidsson, v. Hill [1901] 2 K. B. 606, 618;
Hughes, Admiralty (2d ed. 1920) sees. 108-110.
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for wrongful death on navigable waters of the United States,5
nor for wrongful death on the high seas on board a vessel of the
United States," although, of course, American courts of admiralty
and of common law, under ordinary principles of conflict of laws,
entertained libels based on foreign law where the cause of action
for wrongful death arose in the territorial waters, or on the high
seas on board a vessel of a foreign nation whose law afforded a
remedy in such cases.7
II.
THE STATE DEATH ACTS
(a) In General
But the courts were not long in alleviating this situation con-
siderably by resorting to the various state death acts to give a
remedy for wrongful death on navigable waters.8 Notwithstand-
ing the contrary inferences which might have been drawn from
the doctrine of Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen" the Supreme
Court has recently reaffirmed the legislative power of the states
to modify or supplement the maritime law in this particular, on
the ground that such legislation "will not work material preju-
dice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law."'1
5 The Harrisburg, supra note 1; The Wydale, supra note 2; Bloom v.
Furness-Withy Co., supra note 2. For the exceptional case of Hawaii, see
The Schooner Robert Lewers Co. v. Kekauoha (1902, C. C. A. 9th) 114
Fed. 849.
6 The Alaska, supra note 2; Armstrong v. Beadle (1879, C. C. D. Calif.)
5 Saw. 484; Fisher v. Boutelle Transportation Co., supra note 2.7 La Bourgogne (1908) 210 U. S. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. 664; Robinson r,.
Detroit Navigation Co. (1896, C. C. A. 6th) 73 Fed. 883; Geoghegan v.
Atlas Steamship Co. (1893, C. P.) 3 Misc. 224, 22 N. Y. Supp. 749; Cat-a-
nagh v. Ocean Steam Nay. Co. (1890, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 59 Hun, 618, 13
N. Y. Supp. 540.
s The cases are too numerous for extensive citation. For some of the
earlier decisions see Steamboat Company v. Chase (1872, U. S.) 16 Wall.
522;' Sherlock v. AIling (1876) 93 U. S. 99 (even though vessel engaged in
interstate commerce); Mahler v. Norwich & N. Y. Transportation Co.
(1866) 35 N. Y. 352; Opsahl v. Judd (1883) 30 Minn. 126, 14 N. W. 575;
Holmes v. Oregon & C. Ry. (1880, D. C. Or.) 5 Fed. 75; The City of Nor-
walk (1893, S. D N. Y.) 55 Fed. 98, on appeal (1894, C. C. A, 2d) 61
Fed. 364.
9 Southern Pacific Ry. v. Jensen (1917) 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524.
10 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia (1921) 257 U. S. 233, 242, 42 Sup. Ct. 89,
90; Great Lakes Co. v, Kierefewski (1923) 261 U. S. 479, 43 Sup. Ct. 418.
The totality of the maritime law of a given state (i.e., the law applicable
to matters within "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction") is thus derived
from several sources: 1. The Constitution of the United States, which
itself (by judicial construction) established as part of the supreme law
of the land "apiroved rules of the general maritime law.." Knickerbocker
Ice Co. v. Stewart (1920) 253 U. S. 149, 160, 40 Sup. Ct. 438, 440; State
of Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co. (1924) 264 U. S. 219, 44 Sup. Ct.
302. 2. Acts of Congress pursuant to its implicit legislative power over
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(b) Defeizces Goverzed by State Law
When a plaintiff founds his action for wrongful deatir upon a
state statute, he is subject, in the matter of defences, to any limi-
tations with which the state has hedged the right about;"i and
this, whether the suit is brought at common law or in admiralty.
Thus, the applicable state statutory period of limitation was en-
forced in Western Fuel Conzpanzy v,. Gareia1 - to bar a libel in pcr-
maritime matters. PaaMa R. R. -1. JohnZson (1924) 264 U. S. 375, 330, 44
Sup. Ct. 391, 393. 3. Local modifications of the "general maritime law"
by state statutes (or judicial decisions?) which do not conflict with any
act of Congress and which, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, do not
"work material prejudice to any characteristic feature of the general
maritime law, or interfere with the proper harmony or uniformity of that
law in its international or interstate relations." We.tcra Fuel Co. v.
Garcia, supra note 10.
11 Qui2nette v. Bisso (1905, C. C. A. 5th) 136 Fed. 825, 838. In Dobrin
v. Mallory Steamship Co. (1924, E. D. N. Y.) 298 Fed. 349, an admiralty
court denied recovery under the Washington death act, because under such
act recovery cannot be had by relatives residing in a foreign country.
See also Beebe v. Uchida Steamship Co (S. D. N. Y.) 1924 A. M. C. 1192
(liability of owner under death act for negligence of compulsory pilot
determined by common law rules of agency).
12 Wester& Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra note 10; Inter ational Nav. Co. v.
Lindstrom (1903, C. C. A. 2d) 123 Fed. 475; cf. Stcrn r'. La Coiapagnic
Ginirale Transatlantiq'e (1901, S. D. N. Y.) 110 Fed. 99; Laidlaw v.
Oregon Ry. (1897, C. C. A. 9th) 81 Fed. 876. In The Harrsburg, upr7a
note 1, at 214, where the state period of limitation was enforced in
admiralty, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between a period of
limitation inherent in the right itself, and one that operated only to bar
the remedy. "The time within which the suit must be brought operates
as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy
alone. . . . The liability and the remedy are created by the same
statutes, and the limitations of the remedy are therefore to be treated as
limitations of the right," See Norman v. Merritt & Chapnia Co. (S. D.
N. Y.) 1924 A. Al. C. 611.
But an examination of the statutes to determine whether the legislature
intended the lapse of the period to terminate the right or merely to bar
the remedy is likely to lead one into verbal quibbles. See Sharrow -e.
Inland Lines, Ltd. (1915) 214 N. Y. 101, 10$ N. E. 217. In the Garcia
case, supra note 10, no such distinction was emphasized. In that case
Section 1970 of the Caljf. Cd vil Code, prviding for the right to recover
for wrongful death, contained no limitation concerning the time within
which action must be brought. In Section 340 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, included under a title dealing generally with "Time of Com-
mencing Civil Actions", it was provided that several tort actions, includ-
ing that for wrongful death, "can only be commenced [within one year]
after the cause of action shall have accrued." This looks like a limitation
going to the remedy only, under the test suggested in The Haritburg,
su'pra note 1, yet the Supreme Court held that this limitation should have
been enforced by the Federal District Court in California, sitting in
admiralty. It seems that the inquiry should be: whether the statutor_
provision for a one year limitation is directed only to the state courts, or
whether it is intended to operate wherever suit is brought. It is con-
ceivable that a state legislature might say, "We create this right; lwe
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sonam in admiralty. Similarly, where contributory negligence of
the decedent bars recovery under the statute in the state courts,
it will'b;ar recovery in admiralty, notwithstanding the general
maritime rule of divided damages. 13 And the same is held with
reference to defences of assumption of risk,', fellow servant"
and imputed negligence.16 So too, limitations in the statute as
to the amount of recovery will be enforced in admiralty. 7
(c) Effect of Workmen's Compensation Acts
In determining whether an action for wrongful death may be
maintained under a state death act, it may be necessary first to
consider the operation of the state workmen's compensation act.
The compensation acts, wherever applicable, preclude recovery
against the employer under the death statutes, and relieve the
plaintiff from the necessity of making out a case of negligence.
In cases where the compensation acts are not applicable, recovery
can be had, on proof of negligence only, under the death acts.'8
Hence, as a preliminary matter, consideration must be given to
Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen'- and the subsequent de-
cisions of the Supreme Court elaborating the doctrine of that
celebrated case. A detailed survey of this contemporary legal
battleground is beyond the scope of this paper.2 0
forbid our state courts to entertain an action thereon after one year,
because we don't want our dockets cluttered up with stale claims. But
it doesn't matter to us how long suit is delayed in the federal courts or
the courts of other states."
12 Gretschmann v. Fix (1911, W. D. N. Y.) 189 Fed. 716; see O'Brien v.
Luckenback Steamship Co. (1923, C. C. A. 2d) 293 Fed. 170; The A. W.
Thompson (1889, S. D. N. Y.) 39 Fed. 115; Robinson v. Detroit & Cleve.
land Nay. Co., supra note 7. The contrary holding in Thd Devona (1924,
D. C. Me.) 1 Fed. (2d) 482, seems to have been inspired by a mistaken
conception of the effect of Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co. (1918)
247 U. S. 372, 38 Sup. Ct. 501. See a criticism of the case in (1925) 38
YARv. L. Rnv. 672. In The James McGee (1924, S. D. N. Y.) 300 Fed. 93,
97, an admiralty court applying the New Jersey death act, held that the
New Jersey law must determine whether failure to blow a whistle, in
violation of a statute, raised a presumption of contributory negligence.
14 O'Brien v. Lucko'nbach Steazmship Co., supra note 13.
1s The City of Norwalk, supra note 8; Grimsley v. Hankins (1891, S. D.
Ala.) 46 Fed. 400.
16 See Robinson v. Detroit & Cleveland Steam Nay. Co., supra note 7;
Quinette v. Bisso, supra note 11; Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 3, see. 67.
17 Quinette v. Bisso, supra note 11; Thompson Towing & Wrecking As-
soc. v. McGregor (1913, C. C. A. 6th) 207 Fed. 209.
is Roswall v. Gray's Harbor Stevedore Co. (1925, Wash.) 231 Paec. 934;
Lee v. W. & A. Fletcher Co. (1925, C. C. A. 3d) 4 Fed. (2d) 3; Butler v.
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. (1925) 240 N. Y, 23, 147 N. E. 235.
19 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra note 9.
20 For a reference to numerous articles on the subject see Brandeis, J.,
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(d) Jurisdiction of State and Federal, Courts
Assuming that the injury, because of the place where it was
inflicted, is a "maritime tort" and that a particular state death
act is applicable, the decedent's representative may have several
alternatives in the matter of bringing suit.
dissenting, in Washington ,. W. C. Dawson & Co., svpra, note 10, n. 18.
See also Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction of Late Years (1924) 37 HAv. L.
REv. 529; Wright, Uniformity in the Maritie Law of the Lriitcd States
(1925) 73 U. PA. L. REv. 123.
The somewhat vague principle is that the worlmien's compensation acts
cannot constitutionally apply where they would work "material prejudice
to the characteristic features of the general maritime law." The effect
of the decisions to date seems to be that the workmen's compensation acts
are invalid for this reason only in so far as it is attempted to apply
them to cases where the employee was injured on navigable waters while
engaged in performing a maritime contract. Such a case was WaJsington
v. W. C. Dawson & Co., supra note 10, where a stevedore, workdng under a
maritime contract, died as a result of injuries received on board a vezcel
in San Francisco harbor. On the other hand, in State Industrial Corn-
mission v. Nordenholt Co. (1922) 259 U. S. 203, 42 Sup. Ct. 473 (compul-
sory compensation act) and in Netherlands Amcrica Steam Nan. Co. v.
Callagher (1922, C. C. A. 2d) 2S2 Fed. 171 (elective compensation act)
where the stevedore, still performing a maritime contract, happened to
receive his hurt on the dock, it was held that the state worlnen's com-
pensation act could validly apply. And in Grant Smith-Portcr Ship Co.
v. Rohde (1922) 257 U. S. 469, 42 Sup. Ct. 157, the state workmen's com-
pensation act was held applicable where a carpenter was injured on nav-
igable waters while engaged in completing a launched vessel then under
construction-a non-maritime contract. It may be noted that in the
Rohde case the workmen's compensation act in question was an elective
one; and the Supreme Court has not yet expressly decided whether the
doctrine of that case applies also where the act is compulsory. But many
state courts have so applied it. Zahlor ev. Dep't. of Labor & Indumtrie3
(1923) 125 Wash. 410, 217 Pac. 55; Larson V. Newburgh Shipyards, In7c.
(1922, 3d Dept.) 199 App. Div. 797, 192 N. Y. Supp. 239; Los Angeles Ship
Building Co. v. Induistrial Accident Comm. (1922) 57 Calif. App. 352, 207
Pac. 416.
Query, what the Supreme Court would hold in a case of injury on nav-
igable waters to a workman employed under a non-maritime contract to
work, generally on land, but who, at the time of injury, was actually
engaged in maritime labor. See (1922) 35 HAnv L. REv. 743, 746. Cf.
O'Hara's Case (1924) 248 lass. 31, 142 N. E. 844; Maleszy v. Standard
Shipbuilding Corp. (1923) 237 N. Y. 250, 142 N. E. 602. Where the ques-
tion of fact is in doubt, the burden is on the employer to establish that
the employee was injured on navigable waters, in order to preclude the
application of the state workmen's compensation act. Taylor v. Robert
Ramsay Co. (1921) 139 BId. 113, 114 Atl. 830. In Berry v. Donovan &
Sons (1921) 120 Me. 457, 115 Atl. 250, the court made a distinction be-
tween compulsory and elective workmen's compensation acts, which, in view
of the Nordenlwlt case, supra, was unnecessary to sustain the jurisdiction
of the Workmen's Compensation Commission in that case. On principle
it would seem to be arguable that an elective act, at least where elective
both on the part of the employer and employee, would not fall within the
purview of the Jensen decision. See (1922) 35 HtAnv. L. Rv. 743, 74G.
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1. He may bring a common law action in a state court2 ' under
the saving clause2 2 preserving the concurrent jurisdiction of state
courts to afford a common law remedy in maritime cases.
2. If there is the requisite diversity of citizenship, he may,
under the saving clause, bring an action on the common law side
of the federal district court. 23
3. He may bring a libel in personam in admiralty. 21 The
state death act, being validly applied to the case, is a part of the
maritime law.2 5  "The effect of the statute is to attach a new
legal right and responsibility to a purely maritime transaction.
But that does not make the case in its essential nature any less
a maritime case." 2G
Where both employer and employee elect to accept the compensation act,
why is it not merely a matter of contract regulating their mutual rights
and obligations? Would even a court of admiralty hold invalid a contract
between a stevedore and his employer, substituting a scale of compensa-
tion for all industrial accidents in place of the liability existing under the
common law, the death acts, or the general maritime law? See Grant
Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, supra; Jordan v. Frederick Layland Co. Ltd.
(E. D. La.) 1925 A. M. C. 1340. Although in Southern Pacific Co. v,.
Jensen, supra note 9, and in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, supra
note 10, the workmen's compensation act was of the compulsory variety,
the court did not emphasize this feature; and in Peters v. Veasey (1919)
251 U. S. 121, 40 Sup. Ct. 65, the court applied the doctrine of the Jensen
case to forbid recovery under the Louisiana workmen's compensation act
by a stevedore injured on navigable waters even though the particular act
was an elective one. No point was made of the suggested distinction.
Many state courts have applied the doctrine of the Jensen case to elective
workmen's compensation acts. Duart v. Simmons (1918) 231 Mass. 313,
121 N. E. 10; O'Brien v. Scandanavian-American Line (1920) 94 N. J. L.
244, 109 Atl. 517. But see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bacon (1923) 30 Ga. App.
728, 119 S. E. 458.
21 Sherlock v. Alling, supra note 8; Robinson v. Robins Dry Dock Co.
(1924) 238 N. Y. 271, 144 N. E. 579; Roswall v. Gray's Harbor Stevedore
Co., supra note 18. The Florida death act has been construed, however,
as affording a remedy only by libel in admiralty. Young v. Clyde Steam-
ship Co. (1923, S. D. Fla.) 294 Fed. 549. A common law action is thus
precluded, either in a state or federal court.
22 "Saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common law remedy
where the common law is competent to give it." Judicial Code, sec. 24 (3).
23 See Dobrin v. Mallory Steamship Co., supra note 11; Bloom v. Furness-
Withy Co., supra note 2; Young v. Clyde Steamship Co., supra note 21.
In such a case, if the suit is commenced in a state court, defendant is
entitled to a removal to the federal court. See Bloom v. Furness-Withy
Co., supra.
24 Great Lakes Co. v. Kierejewski, supra note 10.
25 See supra note 10.
26 Addison Brown, D. J., in The City of Norwalk, supra note 8. And
by the Federal Judicial Code, sec. 24 (3) the district courts are given
original jurisdiction "of civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdic.
tion".
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4. He may bring a libel in. re in admiralty in a federal dis-
trict court provided the state statute creates a maritime lien. -7
The state statute being the source of the right, if the legislature
has not seen fit to create a lien none will be supplied by a court
of admiralty. 2s
But he may not maintain a libel in rcm in a state court, even
if the state statute purports to authorize such a proceeding.-5
Offhand, it may seem curious that the maritime lien or privi-
lege, a substantive property right created by the state legislature,
can be enforced only in the federal courts. ' But this result in-
evitably follows from the facts: first, that the lien, being created
by competent authority, is an integral part of the maritime law;-,
second, that by act of Congress the federal district courts have
exclusive jurisdiction of all civil maritime causes "saving to
suitors the right of a common law remedy;" 32 and third, that
the proceeding hn rem "in which the vessel itself is seized and
impleaded as the defendant, and is judged and sentenced accord-
ingly," 3 is not a common law remedy within the meaning of the
saving clause.
(e) Construction of Typical Death Acts
Before considering in more detail the application of the state
death acts, it is necessary to answer a preliminary question of
construction. To what "act" do the statutes attach legal conse-
quences? One might imagine a case of an interstate railroad
where a negligent act in state A (e.g., throwing an incorrect
block signal) causes in state B a wreck in which a passenger
receives injuries from which he subsequently dies in state C.
27 The Oregon (1891, D. C. Or.) 45 Fed. 62, (1897, C. C. A. 9th) 81
Fed. 876; The General Foy (1910, D. C. Or.) 175 Fed. 590, and eaces
cited. The lien, if validly created by state statute, would have all the
characteristics of a maritime lien. See The Corsair (1892) 145 U. S.
335, 347, 12 Sup. Ct. 949, 952; cf. The J. E. Rumbell (1893) 148 U. S. 1,
13 Sup. Ct. 498; The Easby (1912, D. C. Ald.) 201 Fed. 5S5.
2S The Corsair, supra note 27. See The City of Norwalh:, supra note 8,
at 110-111; The Mariska (1901, C. C. A. 7th) 107 Fed. 989. The maritime
lien is not a mere matter of procedure, but a substantive property interest.
The Cvzco (1915, W. D. Wash.) 225 F~d. 169. The contrary holding in
The Garland (1881, E. D. Mich.) 5 Fed. 924 and The E. B. Wa;-d (1883,
E. D. La.) 17 Fed. 456, where libels in rcm were allowed although the
state statutes did not give a lien, have been overruled. As to the con-
struction of the state death acts and "water craft laws" in determining
whether a lien is given, see The Alaska, supra note 2, and L. R. A. 1916
A, 1161 et seq.
29 See The Hine v. Trevor (1866, U. S.) 4 Wall. 555; Rounds v. Clovcr-
port Fovudry (1915) 237 U. S. 303, 35 Sup. Ct, 596.
30 See The Lottawanna (1874, U. S.) 21 Wall. 558, 580.
3 See supra note 10.
32 Judicial Code, see. 24 (3), see. 256.
3 Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry, supra note 29, at 300.
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It would be perfectly possible for all three states to impose lia-
bility based on the "operative facts" 34 occurring within their
respective borders. 3r They would be distinct obligations; the
satisfaction of one would not discharge the others.
Now if the death acts were construed "as intended to cover all
cases which they are competent to govern" 30 overlapping lia-
bilities would result in the case supposed. Such a burdensome
situation could hardly have been within the contemplation of the
legislatures; and it would be desirable if the courts could agree
upon a common construction of the death acts which would ob-
viate the difficulty. For the most part, the state statutes adopt
substantially the language of Lord Campbell's Act:31
"Whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrong-
ful act, neglect, or default . . . the person who would have
been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action
for damages. "
The courts have definitely decided that such statutes do not im-
pose liability where the only operative fact occurring within the
borders of the state is the death.38 Hence, in the case above
supposed, the death act of state C would not apply. There hag
been less occasion to differentiate between the wrongful act or
omission and the resultant fatal injury, because in the nature of
things these two operative facts would ordinarily occur within
the borders of the same state.39 There is, however, authority
for the view that the applicable death act is that of the state
34 See Cook, Recognition of "Massachusetts Rights" by New York Courts
(1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 67, 70, note 10.
35 State A can certainly impose a tort liability for a negligent act com-
mitted within its borders which results in certain consequences, whother
inside or outside its borders. Such an obligation would be entitled to inter-
national recognition and enforcement on ordinary principles of conflict of
laws. Likewise, state B could impose an obligation upon those responsible
for the fatal injury within its borders. That the death in state C as a
consequence of defendant's negligence elsewhere is a sufficient basis for
the imposition of liability by state C may be inferred from Commnonwealth
v. Macloon (1869) 101 Mass. 1.
36 The Hamilton (1907) 207 U. B. 398, 405, 28 Sup. Ct. 133.
37 Lord Campbell's Act (1846) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93. For a collection of
the statutes see Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 3. A few of the statutes con-
tain special phraseology which may affect the problem. See, e.g., the
statutes of District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois and Wisconsin.
38 Needham v. Grand Trunk R. R. (1865) 38 Vt. 294; Rudiger v. CM-
cago, St. Paul R. R. (1896) 94 Wis. 191, 68 N. W. 661; Louisville & Nash-
ville R. R. v. Williams (1896) 113 Ala. 402, 21 So. 938; Van Doren v.
Pennsylvania R. R. (1899, C. C. A. 3d) 93 Fed. 260; Alaska Commercial
Co. v. Williams (1904, C. C. A. 9th) 128 Fed. 362; De Hams v. Mexican
Nat. Ry. (1893) 86 Tex. 68, 23 S. W. 381. See Slater v. Mexican Nat,
R. R. (1904) 194 U. S. 120, 126-127, 24 Sup. Ct. 581, 583.
3D In some of the cases cited in the preceding note holding that the death
act of the state wherein decedent died is not applicable, it is not easy to
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wherein the fatal injury occurred; that is, where the fatal force
was brought into contact with the body of the victim, rather than
where the wrongful act or omission took place4 One would in-
cline to this construction, because in the normal case the state
within whose borders the plaintiff's legal right is invaded im-
poses the delictual obligation to make reparation. The death acts
create a new legal right in the next of ldn, a right not to have
their relative fatally injured. Therefore, leaving aside other con-
siderations, such as the special problem to be discussed later con-
cerning the application of death acts to the high seas, the death
act of a particular state is presumably applicable only to cases
where the fatal injury occurs within its borders.
The case of Alabama Great South rn Railroad Company v.
Carrollt,, is suggestive, although not directly in point. Through
the negligence of certain railway employees in Alabama an acci-
dent occurred in Mississippi wherein the plaintiff was injured.
A statute in Alabama provided that "when a personal injury
is received by a servant or employee in the service or business
of the master or employer, the master or employer is liable to
answer in damages," although the injury may have resulted
from the negligence of certain described fellow servants. The
Alabama court held that the plaintiff could not recover under
the statute in question because the injury occurred in Mississippi.
The statute, the court said,
"is to be interpreted in the light of universally recognized prin-
ciples of private international or interstate law as if its opera-
tion had been expressly limited to this state and as if its first
line read as follows: 'when a personal injury is receied ii Ala-
bamga by a servant or employee, etc.'"
discover from the language of the courts whether they regard the sigqnifi-
cant operative fact or the consequence thereof, i.e., the fatal injury, as
the wrongful act. It was not necessary in those cases to discriminate.
40 Chicago, etc., R. R. v. Doyle (1883) 60 Miss. 977. See Alaola Coi-
raercial Co. v. Williams, supra note 38; and note in 56 L. R. A. 210-213.
In Moore v. Pywell (1907) 29 App. D. C. 312, the defendant, a druggist
in the District of Columbia, negligently put poison in a prescription, re-
sulting in the death in Maryland of the person who took the medicine.
The court allowed an action for wrongful death; but it is difficult to dis-
cover after a diligent reading of the opinion whether the court considered
the Maryland or the District of Columbia death act the foundation of the
plaintiff's case.
The Pennsylvania cases are obscure. It seems to have been held that
the Pennsylvania death act applies if the wrongful act or omission oc-
curred in Pennsylvania though the fatal injury occurred in another state.
See Derr v. Lehigh Valley R. R. (1893) 158 Pa. 365, 27 At 1002; Hood-
wmacher v. Lehigh Valley R. R. (1907) 218 Pa. 21, 00 Atl. 975; Ceptofanti
v. Pennsylvania R. R. (1914) 244 Pa. 255, 90 Atl. 558.
41Alabaina Great Southern R. R. v. Carroll (1892) 97 Ala. 126, 14,
135, 11 So. 803, 808.
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The court also found support in the analogy of the
"well established doctrine of criminal law, that where the un-
lawful act is committed in one jurisdiction or state and takes
effect-produces the result which it is the purpose of the law to
prevent or, it having ensued, punishment for-in another juris-
diction or state, the crime is deemed to have been committed and
is punished in that jurisdiction or state in which the result is
manifested, and not where the act was committed. 1 Bish. Cr.
Law, Sec. 110 et seq."
To avoid then, the multiplication of liabilities for wrongful
death arising out of the same accident, it seems preferable to
construe the typical state death acts as applicable only to cases
where the fatal injury was received within the territorial juris-
diction of the state either on land or water. This construction
would take care of a case of this sort: a negligent collision of
two vessels on the Virginia side of the Potomac River, as a result
of which one of the vessels, after crossing over to the Maryland
side, sinks, thereby precipitating a passenger into the water
from whence he is subsequently rescued and taken into Wash-
ington where he dies from effects of exposure. The Maryland
death act would apply.
(f) Wh'ether a Particular Wrongful Death is a Maritime or
Non-manritime Tort
Even though a particular state death act is admittedly appli-
cable to the wrongful death, the locus of the injury must be ex-
amined to determine whether an action on such statute may be
maintained in admiralty. As has been shown above, the "wrong-
ful act" for which the next of kin are afforded a right of action
is the application of fatal force to the body of the victim. There-
fore, if the fatal force is applied to the victim on land, the ad-
miralty has no jurisdiction even though such force is put in
motion by an initial act of negligence on navigable waters.42
Thus, if a hoisting derrick negligently operated on ship-board
should let loose a bale of cotton which falls and kills a person
standing on the wharf, the admiralty would have no jurisdic-
tion.43 Conversely, if the fatal force is applied to the body of
deceased on navigable waters, the admiralty would have juris-
diction although the chain of causation was initiated by a negli-
gent act on shore.
Likewise, if the fatal force is applied to the body of the de-
ceased on navigable waters, the admiralty has jurisdiction even
though the death occurs on shore. A learned writer has con-
42 See Rorvie v. North. Pac. Lumber Co. (1921) 99 Or. 58, 195 Pac,. 163.
43 See The Mary Stewart (1881, E. D. Va.) 10 Fed. 137 (a libel for
personal injuries, not a case of death-but the same principle applies).
It is not a "maritime tort."
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tended the contrary on the theory that "the gist of the injury"
to the next of ldn is the death, and that if that death occurs on
shore it is not a maritime tort ;"- and there are a few decisions
in the district courts to this effect5 But an impres!ive prepon-
derance of authority, with the better reason, it is submitted, sup-
ports the admiralty jurisdiction in such a case." ' This view is
supported, also, by the numerous cases of fatal accidents on inter-
state railroads, where the courts have regularly decided that the
applicable death act is that of the state wherein the accident oc-
44 Hughes, Admiralty, op. cit. supra note 4, see. 113. If this argument
were sound, then the admiralty would have jurisdiction where decedent
was fatally injured on land and happened to die later on shipboard as the
result of his injuries.
-Ryley v. Philadelphia & Read. Ry (1909, S. D. N. Y.) 173 Fed. 839;
The Kaia.1 Ma,1ar (1924, D. C. Or.) 2 Fed. (2d) 121 (stevedore negligently
injured in hold of ship, later died on shore; held admiralty could not
entertain action under state death act).
4 The Anglo Patagonian (1916, C. C. A. 4th) 235 Fed. 92; The Clik-wich
(1916, C. C. A. 5th) 231 Fed. 452; The Samnzangcr (1924, S. D. Ga.) 2958
Fed. 620; Liverani v. John. T. Clark & Son (1919, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 176
N. Y. Supp. 725. Compare Dzki-zgclcvsly v. Turnzer & Blanchard, Izc.
(1919, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 107 Misc. 45, 176 N. Y. Supp. 729; Hamburg
American Co. v. Gye (1913, C. C. A. 5th) 207 Fed. 247.
In many cases where the fatal injury occurred on the water, the court
neglected to state whether the ensuing death occurred on land or on
water, evidently regarding this fact as not significant. State of Maryland
v. Hamburg American Steam Packet Co. (1911, D. C. Md.) 190 Fed. 240;
Young v. Clyde Steamship Co., supra note 21. See Sozden v. Fore
River Shipbuilding Co. (1916) 223 Mass. 509, 112 N. E. 82; The Sehoo.cxi
Robert Lewers Co. v. Kekaztoha, supra note 5.
Mr. Hughes suggests that it is important to distinguish between death
acts and survival acts. Hughes, op. cit. supra note 4, sec. 113. Cases may
occur where this distinction must be made. Thus, suppose a person on
the deck of a ship moored at dock is by a negligent act struck, pitched
over the rail and killed by impact with the wharf. If the accident had
not resulted fatally, the injured person could have sued in admiralty on a
maritime tort. The Strabo (1898, E. D. N. Y.) 90 Fed. 110, (1900, C. C.
A. 2d) 98 Fed. 99S. His legal right to personal security was invaded on
navigable waters; the tort was complete there, although additional damage
by way of aggravation occurred on land when he struck the dock. (For
the converse case, see The Albion (1903, D. C. Wash.) 123 Fed. 189).
Hence, if a survival statute permits the personal representative to main-
tain the cause of action which accrued to the decedent in his life-time, a
libel thereon may be entertained in admiralty. The death acts, however,
create a new right of action in favor of the next of kin, based, not upon
the initial invasion of the decedent's right to personal security, but rather
upon the wrongful act of bringing him in contact with a fatal force. A3
the fatal force here was the impact with the dock, admiralty would have
no jurisdiction of an action under a death act, since that tort was non-
maritime. See generally for the distinction between the two types of
statutes, Schumacher, Rights of Action undcr Death and Survival Statutes
(1924) 23 Mic. L. Rnv. 114, and a note in (1902) 15 ILRv. L. RLv. 854.
It is submitted, however, that the place where the victim happens to die
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curred, rather than that of the state wherein the victim happened
to die. 47
Some difficulty may arise where the fatal injury occurs on or
about a dry-dock. Under the locality test, is a tort committed on
board a ship in dry-dock a maritime tort? In the case of a float-
ing dry-dock the answer would clearly be in the affirmative. "A
vessel in a dry-dock which is afloat in navigable waters, is itself
in those waters as truly as if moored to a wharf or beside a
pier." 48 Accordingly, admiralty would have jurisdiction of an
action for wrongful death where the fatal injury occurred on
board a ship in a floating dry-dock.49  And as to a tort com-
mitted on a vessel in a stationary, non-floating dry-dock, there
seems no convincing reason why the admiralty jurisdiction should
be denied any more than in a case where a ship has been beached
in a storm or has taken ground in the outgoing of the tide."'
In The Anglo Patagonian"' a workman was working upon a
staging swung from the bow of a ship in dry-dock. By negli-
gence, the starboard anchor was permitted to drop from the
hawse pipe and strike the staging with great violence, thereby
precipitating the workman to the bottom of the dock. He subse-
quently died in a hospital on shore. A recovery in admiralty
under the state death act was allowed. Mention has already
been made of the fact that death on shore does not deprive ad-
miralty of jurisdiction provided the fatal injury occurred in a
place subject to admiralty jurisdiction. Here the fatal force was
applied not on shipboard or an appendage thereto (as would
have been the case had the workman been killed by a direct blow
of the anchor while he was on the dependent staging), but on
the dry-dock itself, for the decedent was killed by striking the
bottom of the dry-dock. The decision then, involves the holding
is without significance in applying this distinction between the death acts
and the survival acts.
4 See supra note 38.
48 Danielsen v. Morse Dry Dock Co. (1923) 235 N. Y. 439, 139 N. E.
567; certiorari denied (1924) 262 U. S. 756, 43 Sup. Ct. 703.
40 This holding was necessarily involved in Warren v. Morse Dry Dock
& Repair Co. (1923) 235 N. Y. 445, 139 N. E. 569. See also Danielson v.
Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., supra note 48; Groonstad v. Robins Drtl
Dock & Repair Co. (1923) 236 N. Y. 52, 139 N. E. 777; The J. M. Guffey
(1911, C. C. A. 2d) 188 Fed. 66. In Gonsalves v. Morse Dry Dock Co.
(1924) 266 U. S. 171, 45 Sup. Ct. 39, it was held that admiralty had
jurisdiction of a libel for personal injuries on board a ship in a floating
dry dock. Accord: Gray v. New Orleans Dry Dock Co. (1920) 146 La.
826, 84 So. 109. The Warfield (1903, E. D. N. Y.) 120 Fed. 847, must be
taken as overruled.
GoSee The Steamship Jefferson (1909) 215 U. S. 130, 142, 30 Sup. Ct.
54, 58; Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. P. Sanford Ross, Inc. (1915, E. D.
N. Y.) 221 Fed. 105, 108.
si The Anglo Patagonian, supra note 45. Compare Wilson v. Union
Iron Works Co. (1911) 167 Calif. 539, 140 Pac. 250.
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that the dry-dock itself is a place within the admiralty jurisdic-
tion ;-' and hence an admiralty court would have had jurisdiction
of an action for wrongful death in the dry-dock even though no
ship were therein at the time of the injury. This conclusion
might at first blush seem inconsistent with Cape v. Vallette Dry
Dock Companly,53 where it was held that admiralty had no juris-
diction of a libel for salvage services rendered to a floating dry-
dock "permanently moored" to the shore by chains. But that
decision rests upon a narrow ground stated by the court:"'
"A fixed structure, such as this dry-dock is, not used for the
purpose of navigation, is not a subject of salvage service, any
more than is a wharf or a warehouse when projecting into or
upon the water. The fact that it floats on the water does not
make it a ship or a vessel and no structure that is not a ship or
a vessel is a subject of salvage."
This much may readily be conceded, and yet, because the dry-
dock is floating on navigable waters any tortious act that occurs
thereon may be cognizable in admiralty.
The opinion in The Anglo Patagonianz does not distinctly in-
dicate whether the dry-dock there was a floating one or not; it
does not appear that the court regarded this as a material factor.
But in the case of a non-floating dry-dock, it seems impossible
to say that it is a place within the admiralty jurisdiction, any
more than a wharf or pier; from which it would follow that a
libel for wrongful death could not be sustained in admiralty
where the fatal injury occurred on such a dry-dock. It is diffi-
52 To the same effect see Campanile v,. Morse Dry Doc: & Rcpvir Co.
(1923, 2d Dept.) 205 App. Div. 480, 199 N. Y. Supp. 852; Brandics' Cace
(1924) 248 Mlass. 31, 142 N. E. 844 (state vworkmnen's compensation act
cannot apply to personal injuries received in setting up a staging around
a ship in a floating dry dock).
53 Cope v. Trallette Dry Dock Co. (1837) 119 U. S. 625, 7 Sup. Ct. 33G.
And see Berton v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Dock Co. (1915, D. C. X. J.) 219
Fed. 763.
5 At page 627.
5 But a vessel in dry dock may be the object of maritime salvage. The
Jefferson, supra note 50. In The Robert W. Parsons (1903) 191 U. S. 17,
24 Sup. Ct. 8, it was held that a contract to repair a ship in dry dock
was a maritime contract; the court (at p. 33) denying that such a con-
tract was performed on land but adding "had the vessel been hauled up
by ways upon the land and there repaired a different question might
have been presented, as to which we express no opinion." Thus the
right conclusion was reached, but on erroneous grounds, for admiralty
jurisdiction over contracts depends upon subject matter and not locality.
That was made clear in North Pacific Steamship Co. v. Hall Bros. (1919)
249 U. S. 119, 39 Sup. Ct. 221, which put to one side the doubt expressced
in The Robert W. Parsow, supra, and held to be of maritime cognizance a
contract for the repair of a ship hauled out upon the land. Cf. Goncalvc3
v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., supra note 49.
56 The Anglo Patagonian, supra note 45.
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cult, therefore, to support the recent case of Butler v. Robins
Dry Dock & Repair Company.r7 In that case a workman was
engaged in a repair job upon a vessel resting upon blocks in a
"graven dock" which, as the court said, "is distinguished from
a 'floating dock' in that the former is permanently attached to
and in that manner a part of the land." While the workman
was working upon the bottom of the dock under the bulge of the
upper part of the vessel, a plate from the side of the vessel
dropped upon him and caused his death. His administrator
was allowed to recover under the state death act, the state work-
men's compensation act being held inapplicable under the Jenscn
decisiono8 on the ground that the injury was within the admiralty
jurisdiction. The court said:
"The controlling circumstance is that he is engaged in making
repairs on a vessel regarded as being in navigable waters and
the particular foothold within the limits presented by this case
which he utilizes in order to establish contact with the vessel and
do his work cannot be material.
"Moreover, if for the purpose of the determination of the ques-
tion now presented to us a ship is to be regarded as still in navi-
gable water when it has floated into and rests upon the dry bot-
tom of such a dock as this, it must be because such dock is to be
regarded as navigable water instead of land, and if that is so the
intestate constructively was standing in navigable waters at the
time when the plate fell and caused his death."
The sentences of the opinion above quoted are somewhat con-
fusing. If "such dock is to be regarded as navigable water in-
stead of land," then the fact that the workman was engaged in
making repairs on a vessel would not be "the controlling circum-
stance." The workman standing in the bottom of the dock would
be "constructively standing in navigable waters" whether or not
a ship happened to be in the dock at the time. If it be suggested
that the graven dock should be treated as constructively part
of the navigable waters within the admiralty jurisdiction only
when a ship is enclosed within it, why should not a wharf be
similarly regarded when a vessel is moored alongside of it? Yet,
however artificial the distinction may appear as an original ques-
tion,-9 the Supreme Court has adhered to the view that structures
constituting "extensions of the shore" are not within the ad-
miralty jurisdiction, however much such structures may be "aids
to navigation ;" and hence that the admiralty courts have no juris-
diction even though the structure is injured by a negligently navi-
gated vessel.6 0
For these reasons it is submitted that the correctness of the
57Butler v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., supra note 18.
58 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra note 9.
59 See Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction of Late Ycars, supra note 20.
00 The Panoil (1925) 266 U. S. 433, 45 Sup. Ct. 164.
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conclusion in Butler v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Company 1 is
open to serious question. 2
(g) Extraterritorial Application of State Death Acts
Not only might a state validly afford a remedy for wrongful
death within its territorial waters; it came to be recognized,
prior to the Federal Death Act of 1920,1, that such statutes
might have application to wrongful death on the high seas. Thus,
in The Hamilton" a collision occurred off the Virginia coast about
seven miles at sea, between the steamship Hamilton and the
steamship Saginaw, owned respectively by two Delaware cor-
porations, which vessels, presumably, were registered at Dela-
ware ports.6 5 Both vessels were at fault. The Saginaw sank,
resulting in the drowning of several of her passengers and crew.
In a proceeding in admiralty by the owners of the Hamilton for
limitation of liability the Supreme Court held that the Delaware
death act was applicable and afforded a remedy to the next of
kin of the deceased persons., ' Mr. Justice Holmes, for the court,
seemed to rest the competence of the Delaware statute, not upon
the theory expressed below by the Circuit Court of Appealsp
that a Delaware ship on the high seas is "in contemplation of
law, within the territory of that state," but upon the theory of
the personal jurisdiction which Delaware may exercise over its
own corporations or citizens domiciled therein.
"The statute governs the reciprocal liabilities of two corpora-
tions, exsting only by virtue of the laws of Delaware, and per-
61 Bvtler v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., supra note 18.
G2 In O'Hara's Case, szpra note 20, a ship was being repaired in a sta-
tionary dry dock resting upon and attached to the land. A workman
walking along a plank extending from the side of the dry dock to the
side of the ship fell and suffered injuries. It was held under the Jcwsmu
case that the state workmen's compensation act could not apply, as the
injury occurred in a locality subject to admiralty jurisdiction and in the
course of performing a maritime contract. A necessary deduction from
this decision is that if the decedent had been killed in such stationary dry
dock by a wrongful act, admiralty might entertain a libel based on the
state death act. The court said, "whether the dry dock is floating or
resting upon and attached to land is also an immaterial factor .
the essential factor is that the vessel floats into it."
63 Act of March 30, 1920 (41 Stat. at L. 537).
G The Hamilton, supra note 36.
- See the case below (1904, S. D. N. Y.) 134 Fed. 95, (190G, C. C. A.
2d) 146 Fed. 724.
-3 See also McDonald v. Mallory (1879) 77 N. Y. 546; The Starr (1913,
W. D. Wash.) 209 Fed. 882; The Jane Grey (1899, D. C. Wash.) 95 Fed.
693. Armnstrong v. Beadle, supra note 6, is overruled by The Hamilton.
See Whitelock, A New Development in the Application of Extra-territorial
Law to Extra-territorial Marinw Torts (1909) 22 HAM. L. REV. 403.
C7 (1906, C. C. A. 2d) 146 Fed. 724, 726. See Crapo -e. Kelly (1872,
U. S.) 16 Wall. 610, 623 et seq.; Wilson r. McNarace (1880) 102 U. S.
572, 574; Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 3, see. 200.
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manently within its jurisdiction, for the consequences of conduct
set in motion by them there, operating outside the territory of
the state, it is true, but within no other territorial jurisdiction.
If confined to corporations, the state would have power to en-
force its law to the extent of their property in every case. But
the same authority would exist as to citizens domiciled within
the state, even when personally on the high seas, and not only
could be enforced by the state in case of their return, which their
domicile by its very meaning promised, but in proper cases would
be recognized in other jurisdictions by the courts of other states.
In short, the bare fact of the parties being outside the territory
in a place belonging to no other sovereign would not limit the
authority of the state, as accepted by civilized theory. No one
doubts the power of England or France to govern their own ships
upon the high seas."
This theory would require some revision or qualification of
the conclusion previously reached in this article, that the typical
state death act is applicable only where the fatal injury occurs
within the territorial jurisdiction of the state. In the interest of
an easy consistency we are tempted to say that the true basis of
Delaware's legislative jurisdiction in The Hamilton is the fact
that the vessel on which the fatal injury occurred (the Saginaw)
was a Delaware vessel,"s and not the fact that the tort-feasor
happened to be a corporation or citizen of DelawareA'
A determination of the true theory would have become neces-
sary in The Hamilton if it were supposed that a New York citi-
zen, a passenger on the Delaware ship on the high seas, by
wrongful act caused the death of a fellow passenger. It is be-
lieved that in such a case the Delaware law might impose upon
the wrongful actor an obligation which would receive inter-
national recognition.70 If, however, two citizens of Delaware
08 This view is perhaps supported by the language of the Supreme Court
a year later in The La Bourgogne, supra note 7 at 138: "In The Hamilton,
207 U. S. 398, it was also settled that where the law of the state to which
the vessel belonged-in other words, the law of the domicile or flag-
gives a right of action for wrongful death if such death occurred on the
high seas on board of the vessel, the right of action given by the law of
the domicile or flag will be enforced in an admiralty court of the United
States." But see Learned Hand, J., in The James McGee, supra note 13,
at 96. See also, International Navigation Co. v. Lindstrom, supra note 12.
09 See Cavanagh v. Ocean Steam Nay. Co., supra note 13; McDonald v.
Mallory, supra note 66 (which seems to rest on both theories). In Souden
v. Fore River Shipbuilding Co., supra note 46, the court said, "in case of
a death occurring on the high seas, an action may be maintained to
enforce a remedy given by the state where the vessel is owned,-and as
the intestate was killed while on the high seas in a vessel belonging to a
Massachusetts corporation, it was within the territorial jurisdiction of
Massachusetts, and the rights of the parties are to be determined by the
common law and the statutes of this Commonwealth." Here, however,
all the operative facts occurred on board the Massachusetts vessel.
70 See Hall, International Law (8th ed.) 301, 307. It may be that New
York also by virtue of the personal allegiance owed by its citizen might
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were swimming out beyond the three mile limit and one by
wrongful act caused the death of the other, the only theory upon
which an action might be maintained would be that suggested
by Mr. Justice Holmes in The Hamilton.
This problem of the application of law to events on the high
seas is full of complexity, both on principle and on authority.
The present writers have come somewhat reluctantly to the con-
clusion that the explanation just suggested as the true basis of
The Hamilton is too literal and logical an inference from the con-
venient notion that a vessel is "part of the territory of the state
to which it belongs." 71 This is a device of judges to prevent
vessels on the high seas from being lawless. When all the opera-
tive facts (for instance, a negligent act, the fatal injury, and
the ensuing death) occur on a particular vessel, the case is easy.
By a common convention of civilized nations the "law of the
flag" applies, - and, of course, it should make no difference in
what forum suit is brought. Thus, in Southerni Pacific Compaizy
v. De Valle da Costae3 a subject of the kingdom of Portugal, a sea-
man on a vessel owned by a Kentucky corporation, was killed on
the high seas by the negligent operation of the vessel. Suit was
brought by his administrator in a federal court sitting in Mas-
sachusetts and it was held that an action could be maintained
under the Kentucky death act. The court also held that the
Kentucky statute gave an action, although the decedent and his
next of kin were foreigners, this point having been reserved
in The Hamilton.7 "
But where a collision occurs on the high seas between vessels
of different nationalities and a passenger on one vessel meets his
death as a result of negligence on the other vessel the case is
impose another obligation upon him for an act done by him in a place
subject to the jurisdiction of another sovereign. See Willianm v. Sozthcri,
R. R. (1901) 128 N. C. 286, 38 S. E. 893; Loutcks v. Stazdard Oil Co. (1913)
224 N. Y. 99, 109, 120 N. E. 193; 1 Beale, Coikflict of Laws (191G) sec. 100;
Hall, op. cit. 307-308. Yet such an exercise of power is so rare that a
court would hardly be warranted in spelling out such a legislative intent
by implication from the terms of the typical death acts. See Anerikm,
Banana Co. v. United Frtuit Co. (1909) 213 U. S. 347, 355-357, 29 Sup.
Ct. 511. That such a construction would not be given is really involved
in Dobrhn. v. Mallory Steamship Co., sztpra note 11; Ncedhant v. Gmaszd
Trunk R. R., supra note 38. See also infra note 97.
71 See comments of Learned Hand, J., in Thc Jamcs McGcc, svpra note 13,
at 95-96.
-
2La, Bourgogne, supra note 7. "The vessels of such a country are,
even upon the high seas, a detached, floating portion of its territory,
and exclusively within the influence of its laws, so far as tho intcr zal
economy of the vessel is concerned." (Italics ours.) The Lamingfon (1S93,
E. D. N. Y.) 87 Fed. 752, 755.
7 So.thgdr Pacific Co. v. De Irallc da, Costa (1911, C. C. A. 5th) 190 Fed.
689.
74 The Hamilton, supra note 36.
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not so easy. In The Sagamore7s a Massachusetts schooner was
run down and sunk by a British steamer negligently navigated
on the high seas. Several of the crew went down with the
schooner. Libels in personam against the British owners were
filed under the Massachusetts death act. Counsel pressed the
argument that:
"The schooner Olympia, a Massachusetts vessel, while on the
high seas, was a part of the territory of Massachusetts. The
deceased seamen were on board the schooner when she went
down; and therefore, at the time of their death as much in the
territory of Massachusetts, and within the protection of the stat-
ute, as if actually upon the shore of Massachusetts." --
The conclusion urged by counsel logically follows, if we accept
the premise, that a Massachusetts ship on the high seas is in all
respects to be treated as if it were "part of the territory of Mas-
sachusetts." For it is not necessary that the defendant himself
be personally within the jurisdiction of Massachusetts if he or
his servants proximately cause a fatal injury in Massachusetts.
Thus, if the defendant owned a factory on the Rhode Island side
of the boundary between Rhode Island and Massachusetts, and
through negligence of his workmen in the factory an explosion
was caused which killed someone across the line in Massachusetts,
Massachusetts could impose a delictual obligation upon the de-
fendant which would be entitled to international recognition and
enforcement. 77 The court in The Sagamore, however, declined
to accept the premise upon which counsel's argument was
founded. It held that no action could be maintained under the
Massachusetts death act, saying:78
"While the statute 'offers a liability' of Massachusetts owners to
those injured, it does not follow that it may impose a liability
upon citizens of another state who are without its territorial
jurisdiction. Its authority over its own ships and citizens does
not extend to the ships and citizens of another nation."
There seems very little reasonable basis to argue for a common
acceptance by the nations of a principle of conflict of laws which
would acknowledge the competence of Massachusetts law to im-
pose a delictual obligation in a case like this. The same problem
would arise in a libel for collision damage where two vessels of
different nationalities collide on the high seas. If we carry out
logically the conception that a ship on the high seas is "part of
the territory" of the sovereign whose flag it flies, then the law
of the injured ship would determine the liability of the offending
75 The Sagamore, supra note 2.
7 At page 757.
- See Cameron v. Vanderg2.ff (1890) 53 Ark. 381, 386, 13 S. W. 1092.
78 At page 757.
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ship, because the damage was inflicted on "territory" of the
sovereign of the injured ship. Yet the Supreme Court has many
times declared that the "law of the flag" of the injured ship would
not apply.- The continental authorities indicate a tendency to
apply the national law of the offending vessel in such a situa-
tion.10 One can hardly dispose of these decisions by saying,
with a shrug of the shoulder, that they are wrong because they
are in conflict with some pre-existing abstract "principle." Take
a case which now could hardly arise since the general adoption
of the International Rules :- A collision occurs on "no-man's sea"
between a vessel of Nation A and a vessel of Nation B. Each
vessel, according to its own law, is navigating without fault. Is
it not too much to expect the courts of B (or even the courts of
a neutral forum, for one of their vessels might become involved
in a similar situation) to recognize the competence of the law
of A to impose an obligation upon the B vessel or its owner?
And if the law of A is incompetent to determine the liability
of the B vessel or its owners for the collision it would be equally
incompetent to determine the liability of the B vessel or its
owners for one of the consequences of the collision, the deaths
of persons on b6ard the A vessel.62
-9 The Supreme Court has asserted that in such a case there is no
reason in fairness to apply the national law of either country where thoze
laws are not in accord; that the only way out of the dilemma is to apply
"the general maritime law, as understood and administered in the courts
of the country in which the litigation is prosecuted." The Bcgenenvd
(1885) 114 U. S. 355, 369, 5 Sup. Ct 860. See also The Scotland I1881
105 U. S. 24, 29; The Scotia (1871, U. S.) 14 Wall. 170; La Bon'gon,-,
supra note 7, at 115.
There seems little justification on principle for applying the local rulcs
of the forum to a collision on the high seas betveen two foreign vezsels.
Are these cases reaching toward a notion of a "mystic over-law"? Cf.
the language of Judge Holmes in The Western Maid (1922) 257 U. S. 410,
432, 42 Sup. Ct. 159, 160: "We must realize that however ancient may
be the traditions of maritime law, however diverse the sources from which
it has been drawn, it derives its whole and only power in this country
from its having been accepted and adopted by the United States. There
is no mystic over-law to which even the United States must bow. When
a case is said to be governed by foreign law or by general maritime law,
that is only a short way of saying that for this purpose the sovereign
power takes up a rule suggested from without and maies it part of its
own rules."
80 See Lorenzen, Cases on Conflict of Laws (2d ed. 1924) 282, note.
81 See The Belgenland, supra note 79, at 370; Hughes, op. cit. :,npra note
4 at 250, 426 et seq.
s-2 The argument in the text is confined to the ease of wrongful deaths
on the high seas resulting from collision. If defendant in New York gave
poisoned candy to a passenger about to sail on a British vessel, and the
passenger ate the candy on the high seas and died therefrom, it i3
believed that the competence of English law to impose an obligation for
the wrongful death would be generally conceded. So, too, if defendant
41-3
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A further theoretical difficulty might trouble the subtly minded,
if in a case like The Sagamore we say that the death act of
Massachusetts would apply because the decedents were on board
a Massachusetts vessel when she sank. Would not the burden
be on the plaintiff to establish that the decedents actually came
in contact with the fatal force (i.e., the incursion of water into
the lungs) on the vessel and not after jumping overboard and
swimming about in the water? Rundell v. La Compagnie Gn-
6rale Transatlantique took this view. 3  Such a requirement of
proof would certainly be burdensome and unsatisfactory.
In The Sagamore, therefore, the court seems to have been jus-
tified in not applying the Massachusetts death act. The case is
followed in The Aquitania,4 and approved by Justice Learned
Hand in The James McGee.8' On the other hand, might not re-
covery have been had under the English statute? The initial act
of negligence took place on a British vessel on the high seas.
Admittedly, the English legislature is competent to attach legal
consequences to an act done by a person on board a British vessel
on the high seas, which act results in the death of persons on the
Massachusetts vessel.80 The obligation so imposed would be
in New York harbor put a bomb on a British vessel, which exploded on
the high seas, causing deaths. So, although perhaps more doubtful, if a
British and an American vessel were alongside on the high seas, and a
passenger on the American vessel shot across and killed a person on
board the British vessel, the competence of English law to impose an
obligation for the wrongful death might be recognized.
s3 Rundell v. La Compagnie Gingrale Transatlantique (1900, C. C. A.
9th) 100 Fed. 655. The case arose out of the same accident as was in-
volved in La Bourgogne, supra note 7. The court held that the French
law could not apply unless the drowning took place on board the French
ship; that no recovery could be had because the libel by implication al-
leged that the drowning took place "upon the high seas apart from the
vessel." "The locus of the tort, therefore, which must always be deter-
mined by the place where the injury and damage arise, rather than where
the negligent act is committed, must be considered as being upon the
high seas, rather than upon French territory." Wardner, Enforcement
of a Right of Action Acquired Under Foreign Law For Death Upon thd
High Seas (1907) 21 HARV. L. REv. 1, 3, comments as follows: "This line
of argument would seem to be fairly open to the charge of excessive
refinement, and the contrary was taken for granted in Regina v. Kcn
(1876, C. C. R.) 2 Ex. D. 63, 236."
In La Bourgogne, supra, the Supreme Court does not refer to this diffi-
culty. Mr. Justice White states (at p. 103) that the passengers "went
down with the ship". Even if the actual drowning were off the vessel,
the negligent act of navigation occurred on the vessel, and recovery could
be supported under the French law if the provision of the Code may be
interpreted as attaching legal consequences to the doing of the negligent
act from which death ensued. See supra note 35.
&4 The Aquitania (S. D. N. Y.) 1924 A. M. C. 1440.
85 The James McGee, supra note 13, et 96.
88 See supra note 35
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entitled to international recognition and enforcement. It is only
a matter of construction, therefore; and in Davidssoni v. H1V
an English court indicated that Lord Campbell's Act would be
construed to cover such a case. There, a member of the crew
of a Norwegian vessel was drowned as a result of a collision be-
tween a British and a Norwegian vessel on the high seas. The
British vessel was at fault. It was held that the representative
of the Norwegian seaman might recover from the British owner
under Lord Campbell's Act.88
Coming back, then, to The Hamilton, where two Delaware ves-
sels collided on the high seas and passengers on one vessel were
drowned, we finally state the conclusion that the Delaware death
act was properly applied in that case because the initial negli-
gent act, which caused the fatal result, took place on board a
Delaware vessel. The only difficulty is whether the Delaware
statute, and other typical death acts generally, can be construed
in this instance to attach legal consequences to the original negli-
gent act, when, as we have seen in the ordinary cases involving
strictly territorial jurisdiction, such statutes have been construed
as attaching legal consequences to the operative fact of bringing
the fatal force in contact with the victim. The fact that the
parent English act has been so construed by the English courts
may justify a similar construction of the state death acts. This
construction is all the more necessary because in order for the
state death acts to apply at all to deaths resulting from collision
upon the high seasthey must, as has been shown, apply to some
act committed by a person on board a vessel of the state. They
cannot apply in such cases to impose an obligation upon an actor
on board a foreign vessel on the high seas, or at least the indica-
tion of the authorities is that such obligation would receive no
international recognition and enforcement.
In The James McGee 0 the New Jersey death act was held ap-
plicable to give a cause of action for the wrongful death of sea-
men on board a vessel owned by the United States, which was
negligently run into on the high seas by a vessel owned by a New
Jersey corporation. Justice Learned Hand rested the decision
on the power of New Jersey to impose a personal obligation on a
S7Davidsson v. Hill, supra note 4.88 In like manner may be justified The E. B. Ward, Jr. (1883, E. D. La.)
17 Fed. 456, where a collision on the high seas occurred between a Louis-
iana and a Norwegian ship, resulting in the death of a seaman on the
latter ship; and the court allowed an action for wrongful death based on
the Louisiana code. On the point of allowing a libel in rcm where the
state statute does not confer a maritime lien, the case has been overruled
by The Corsair. See supra note 28.
89 The James McGee, supra note 13. And see Aktiesclsfabet Dampsfrib3
Commodore Rollins v. Gorton-Pew Vessels Co. (S. D. N. Y.) 1923 A. ML
C. 484.
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New Jersey corporation for acts done on the high seas, whereas,
for the reasons already stated in discussing The Hamilton, it
might have been preferable to base the legislative power of New
Jersey upon the territorial jurisdiction it exercises over a New
Jersey vessel on the high seas. A contrary result was reached
in The Middlesex0 where a steamer owned by a New' Jersey cor-
poration and whose home port was Boston, negligently rammed
a schooner owned by a Maine corporation. The accident oc-
curred on the high seas. The schooner sank immediately, and
some of her crew were drowned. The court held that no action
for wrongful death was maintainable, but no reasons were given;
and The Hamilton91 was cited without any attempt to distinguish
it. As the three states whose laws might possibly have applied-
Maine, Massachusetts and New Jersey-all had death acts, it
seems that the court with a little ingenuity might have allowed
a recovery on some theory or other. Nothing in The Hamilton
indicates that the "extraterritorial" application of the Delaware
act in that case depended upon the fact that both vessels in the
collision happened to be owned by a Delaware corporation.
In view of the fact that the Federal Death Act of 1920,12 to
be considered hereafter, superseded the state death acts so far as
they had been theretofore applied to wrongful deaths on the
high seas, it might be objected that the cases which have just
been discussed do not now warrant such detailed treatment. But
the problem which those cases raise, of the law applicable to
events on the high seas, comes up again in considering the
operation of the Federal Death Act, and what has already been
said will be pertinent in the subsequent discussion of that act.
Prior to the passage of the Federal Death Act another question
arose not infrequently. Assuming that a vessel on the high seas
is governed by the "law of the flag," is that law determined by
the domicile of the owner or by the port of registry of the ves-
sel? Some discussion of this point is contained in the ensuing
footnote.9 3
90 The Middlesex (1916, D. C. Mass.) 253 Fed. 142; of. The Alaska (1915,
W. D. Wash.) 225 Fed. 545.
91 The Hamilton, supra note 36.
92 Supra note 63.
03 The doctrine of the "law of the flag" in its origin certainly had ref-
erence to the nationality of the vessel as determined by the flag she flies,
rather than of the domicile of the owner or owners. See general dis-
cussioAi in Hall, op. cit. supra note 70, secs. 75-80. But prior to the pas-
sage of the Federal Death Act of 1920 there was no, law of the United
States applicable to wrongful death on the high seas on board a vessel
flying the Stars and Stripes. Applying the original doctrine by analogy
to our federation of states, it seems more natural to hold that the "law
of the flag" is that of the state in which the port of rekistry is situated.
There is some authority for this view. Thns, in Fisher v. Boutelle Trans-
portation & Towing Co. (1908, E. D. Pa.) 162 Fed. 994, a barge ov~ned
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by an Ohio corporation, and employed exclusively on the Atlantic seaboard,
sank on the high seas with all on board. A libel in pcrsonnz was filed by
the personal representative of the deceased master against the Ohio
corporation under the Ohio death act, on the theory that the barge had
been negligently sent out in an unseaworthy condition. The libel was
dismissed for want of evidence that the vessel "belonged" to Ohio by
reason of being enrolled in an Ohio port. The court said (at p. 995)
"the fact that the respondent was chartered by the state of Ohio is not
conclusive of the territorial character of the vessel." In the opinion upon
reargument the court referred to the freshly decided case of The Hamilton,
supra note 36, which it took not to be controlling on the present question.
On the other hand, however, the Circuit Court of Appeals in International
Navigation Co. v. Lindtrow, supra note 12, held that the New Jerzey
death act was applicable to a wrongful death on the high seas of a pa-
senger on board a vessel owned by a New Jersey corporation and regis-
tered in the port of New York. The court was influenced by the fact
that under the old rule (that no maritime lien arose for supplies fur-
nished a ship in her home port) the determining factor was the domicile
of the owner, not the port of registry. The Brigg B. A. Barnard (1SS0,
C. C. E. D. Pa.) 2 Fed. 712. But this was on the theory that credit in
such a case was extended personally to the owner. Those eases have no
bearing on the present problem. See (1903) 17 H, v. L. REV. 199.
In support of the view that the domicile of the owner should determine
the "law of the flag" it may be said that the mere fact that a vessel
of the United States happens to be enrolled or registered in a New York:
port affords a slender basis for the extraterritorial application of New
York law to such vessel while on the high seas. But after all the chief
desideratum is to have a rule definite and easy of application. If the law
of the ship is to be determined by the domicile of the owner, difficultie3
at once arise in the case of part owners domiciled in different states, and
in the case of successive sales of a vessel while abroad. In Solthcra Pa-
cific Co. v. De Valle da Costa, supra note 73, the decedent was killed on
the high seas on board a steamship owned by a Kentucky corporation.
Action was successfully maintained against the owners of the steam-
ship under the Kentucky death act. It did not appear where the vessel
was enrolled; but it plied regularly between New York and Galveston.
See the case below, 160 Fed. 217, 176 Fed. 844. The court assumed the
law of the domicile of the owner to be the one applicable. In Sodcn '.
Fore River Shipbuilding Co., supra note 46, the court said, "in the case
of a death occurring on the high seas an action may be maintained to
enforce a remedy given by the state 'where the vessel is owned'". Here
the vessel was a battleship on a trial trip before before being turned over
to the United States. She probably had not been registered or enrolled
in any port, so it may have been well enough to treat her as a Massa-
chusetts vessel because of the domicile of her owner in Massachusetts.
Ejolstad v. Pacific Coast Steamship Co. (1917, N. D. Calif.) 244 Fed.
634, presented an added complication. There the vessel was owned by a
New Jersey corporation; her home port was New York; but she was
under a demise charter to a California corporation which was operating
her (under a temporary register at San Francisco) in the Pacific coast-
wise trade. In a libel in personaz against the charterers for the wrongful
death of a seaman on the high seas it was held that the New Jersey law
applied. The court said (at p. 635) "it has always been held, that if any
law, in addition to the general maritime law or congressional enactments
is to be applied to a vessel on the high seas, it is not the law of the
state or country where the charterer resides, but the law of the state or
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Many cases have presented a problem in conflict of laws in
respect of whether the "law of the flag," which, as we have seen,
follows the ship on the high seas, should also follow it into the
territorial waters of another state. On principle it would seem
that the lex loci delictus should apply. The fiction that a vessel
is "part of the territory" of the state to which it belongs and
thus is subject to the law of that state, is a convenient device to
take care of the situation on the high seas beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of any particular sovereign. But when the vessel
comes within the territorial waters of another state, the fiction
should yield to fact,94 and the general rule should be applied,
viz., that tort liability is determined by the law of the state
within whose territorial jurisdiction the alleged tortious act
occurred.95 Thus, in Dobrin v. Mallory Steamship Company" '
a stevedore was killed while working on a vessel of New York
registry which was discharging a cargo at Seattle, Washington.
Under the Washington death act no action was maintainable be-
cause the next of kin were non-residents of the United States.
Although the New York death act contained no such limitation,
it was held that no action could be sustained thereon, because
"the ship was in territory over which the state of Washington
was sovereign and the state of New York had no jurisdiction."
There are other decisions to the same effect.,, A departure from
this principle, in the case of seamen, is considered later in this
article.
III.
THE FEDERAL DEATH ACT
(a) Jurisdiction of Federal and State Courts
We come now to the Federal Death Act of 1920, and to a con-
sideration of how far this statute has affected the problems
country of the owner." See also Rainey v. New York & P. S. S. Co. (1914,
C. C. A. 9th) 216 Fed. 449. For a discussion of the provisions for regis-
tering and enrolling vessels of the United States, see Addison C. Burnham,
Vessel Documenting and Conveyancing Law and the Necessity of Revi-
sion, 1925 A. M. C. 1. See also, Home Port Act of Feb. 16, 1925, re-
printed in 1925 A. M. C. 434-435.94 Of. Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon (1923) 262 U. S. 100, 43 Sup. Ct. 504,
holding that the Eighteenth Amendment and the National Prohibition Act
apply to foreign ships within the territorial waters of the United Stato.
See The Cuzco (1915, W. D. Wash.) 225 Fed. 169, 175-176.
95 Smith v. Condry (1843 U. S.) 1 How. 28; Stater v. Mexican Ry., supra
note 38; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown (1914) 234 U. S. 542, 34 Sup.
Ct. 955; The Hannah Nielson (1920, E. D. N. Y.) 267 Fed. 729, 732. See
Goodrich, Tort Obligations and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 73 U. PA. L.
Rnv. 19.
9 Dobrin v. Mallory Steamship Co., supra note 11.
9 The Samnanger, supra note 46 (Georgia law applied where death of
stevedore occurred on a Norwegian vessel in Georgia waters); Wostern
Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra note 10 (California statute applied without
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previously discussed with reference to the application of state
death acts to maritime wrongful deaths. That act,,3 approved
March 30, 1920, provided:
"See. 1. That whenever the death of a person shall be caused by
wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas be-
yond a marine league from the shore of any State, or the District
of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United
States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain
a suit for damages in the district courts of the United States, in
admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, hus-
band, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, per-
son, or corporation which would have been liable if death had
not ensued.
"Sec. 4. That whenever a right of action is granted by the law
of any foreign State on account of death by wrongful act, neglect,
or default occurring upon the high seas, such right may be main-
tained in an appropriate action in admiralty in the courts of the
United States without abatement in respect to the amount for
which recovery is authorized, any statute of the United States
to the contrary notwithstanding.
"Sec. 6. That in suits under this Act the fact that the decedent
has been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar recovery,
but the court shall take into consideration the degree of negli-
gence attributable to the decedent and reduce the recovery ac-
cordingly.
"Sec. 7. That the provisions of any State statute giving or reg-
ulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected
by this Act. Nor shall this Act apply to the Great Lakes or to
any waters within the territorial limits of any State, or to any
navigable waters in the Panama Canal Zone." 3
question where stevedore fatally injured on Norwegian veszel in San
Francisco bay). So, where a stevedore sues for personal injuries, the
courts have applied the law of the place where the injury occurred, not
the "law of the flag". The Cuzco, s2tpra note 94. See also Regina v. Dim-
lop S. S. Co. (1904, E. D. Pa.) 128 Fed. 784; Schooner Robcrt Lczcra Co.
v. Kekauoha, supra note 5; State of Maryland v,. Hamburg Amcrcan
Stearn Packet Co. (1911, D. C. M11d.) 190 Fed. 240; Humboldt Lumbcr Mfg.
Assoc. v. Christopherson (1896, C. C. A. 9th) 73 Fed. 239; Lennan -e.
Hamburg-American S. S. Co. (1902, 1st Dept.) 73 App. Div. 357, "77 N.
Y. Supp. 60. Cf. Opsahl v. Judd, szipra note 8, for the special case of
the joint jurisdiction of Minnesota and Wisconsin over the St. Croix
River. And as to the Ohio River, see Memphis & C. Packct Co. v. PiZ:cy
(1895) 142 Ind. 304, 40 N. E. 527.
98 Supra note 63.
09 Sections not quoted in the text are as follows:
"Sec. 2. That the recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compen-
sation for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit
the suit is brought and shall be apportioned among them by the court in
proportion to the loss they may severally have suffered by reason of the
death of the person by whose representative the suit is brought
"Sec. 3. That such suit shall be begun within two years from the date
of such wrongful act, neglect, or default, unless during that period there
has not been reasonable opportunity for securing jurisdiction of the vezzel.
person, or corporation sought to be charged; but after the expiration of
such period of two years the right of action hereby given shall not be
deemed to have lapsed until ninety days after a reasonable opportunity
to secure jurisdiction has offered.
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Assuming that the Federal Act applies in a particular case, the
right of action by the terms of Section 1 may be enforced in
admiralty by a libel in personam, or by a libel in rem whenever
the vessel would have been liable had death not ensued. 100  It
may be assumed that the statute by implication imposes upon the
vessel in suclV cases a maritime lien with the usual incidents, and
that it is not merely a regulation of procedure for the courts of
the United States. Section I is permissive with reference to suits
in the federal admiralty courts. It does not say that the right
created shall be enforced exclusively in such courts. Therefore,
presumably, the transitory personal action may be enforced in
a state common law court under the general provision of the
saving clause.1 1 In such a suit, however, the state court would
have to apply section six as part of the supreme law of the
land, and thus allow a recovery despite the contributory negli-
gence of the decedent. Whether a common law action may be
brought in the federal courts is not so clear, but the answer is
probably in the affirmative. 1 2
(b) Respective Fields of Operation of Federal and State
Death Acts
The Federal Act was evidently intended to dovetail with, rather
than to overlap, the state death acts. Under Section 7 state death
acts still apply to furnish the rule and measure of recovery where
"Sec. 5. That if a person die as the result of such wrongful act, neglect,
or default as is mentioned in section 1 during the pendency in a court of
admiralty of the United States of a suit to recover damages for personal
injuries in respect of such act, neglect, or default, the personal repre-
sentative of the decedent may be substituted as a party and the suit
may proceed as a suit under this Act for the recovery of the compensation
provided in section 2.
"Sec. 8. That this Act shall not affect any pending suit, action, or
proceeding."
100 The Windrush, (1922, S. D. N. Y.) 286 Fed. 251, aff'd, sub. nor. The
Buenos Aires (1925, C. C. A. 2d) 5 Fed. (2d) 425. If the vessel were in
charge of a compulsory pilot, the vessel might be liable although the
owners are not liable in personam. See Beebe v. Uchida S. S. Co., supra
note 11, and cases cited.
101 Judicial Code, sec. 24 (3). "Saving to suitors in all cases the right of
a common law remedy where the common law is competent to give it."
-02 See The Aquitania, supra note 84. Section 1 says that a libel "may"
be maintained in admiralty. It does not forbid an action at common
law in the federal court founded on this right created by Act of Congress.
The saving clause [Judicial Code, sec. 24 (3)] saves an appropriate com-
mon law remedy in the federal court as well as in a state court where
the requisites of federal jurisdiction are otherwise present. Cf. the con-
verse situation in Panama R. R. v. Johnson, supra note 10, where the court
was considering the Jones Act (41 Stat. at L. 1007) providing that an
injured seaman "may, at his election, maintain an action for damages
at law" with the benefit of the provisions of the federal employers' liability
acts. The court said that this permission to sue at common law did not
by inference exclude a libel in admiralty based on the newly created right.
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the fatal injury occurs within the territorial waters of a state.
The place where the death ultimately occurs is immaterial. Thus,
if the fatal injury is inflicted within the territorial waters of a
state, the state act applies even though the victim does not die
until the vessel has reached "the high seas beyond a marine
league from the shore of any state." Likewise, if the wrongful
act, neglect or default occurs on an American vessel "on the
high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any state"
an action is maintainable under Section I of the Federal Act,
even though death ensues after the vessel has reached the ter-
ritorial waters of a state.
It is contended by Mr. Hughes that the Federal Act could not
apply in case of a death on shore resulting from a fatal injury
received "on the high seas beyond a marine league from the
shore of any state," 103 on the ground that the tort is not "con-
summate" until the death on shore, and hence is not within Con-
gress's legislative jurisdiction over maritime matters. But this
view is opposed to the almost unanimous line of authorities al-
ready referred to,10 holding that the admiralty courts have juris-
diction to entertain a libel founded on a state death act where
the injury occurs upon the territorial waters of the state and
the victim dies on shore. Where the wrongful act occurs upon
the high seas, upon a vessel of the United States, Congress may,
under its maritime legislative power, impose a liability upon the
actor. It is submitted that the Federal Death Act should be so
construed and applied."' Certainly there are practical consid-
erations calling for this result. Suppose, as a result of a negli-
gent collision between a Delaware vessel and a New York vessel
on the high seas beyond the territorial waters of any state, pas-
sengers on each ship are fatally injured, and later die after
being put ashore in Virginia. If the Federal Act does not apply,
is there any remedy at all? It is perfectly clear that the Virginia
act would not apply merely because the deaths occurred in Vir-
ginia.' 0r There would remain only the possibility of recovery by
an extra-territorial application of the state laws of Delaware or
New York, involving the perplexing questions discussed above
in connection with The Hamilton,"1 The Sagamnore,3 and The
Middlesex,"09 and there would also be the difficulty whether the
"law of the ship" is determined by the port of registry, or the
domicile of the owners." 0
103 Hughes, Death, Actions in Admiralty (1921) 31 Y,= LAw JOUIAL,
115, 120.
LO4 See supra note 46.
10 See Benedict, Admiralty (5th ed. 1925) Sec. 142.
"'o6 See supra note 38.
3o7 The Hamilton, supra note 36.
108 The Sagamore, supra note 2.
19 The Middlesex, supra note 90.
120 See supra note 93.
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A more difficult case may be put. Suppose a person on a boot-
leggers' craft, lying on the high seas just beyond the marine
league, fires a gun and kills someone on a revenue cutter steam-
ing within a marine league of the New Jersey coast. Undoubt-
edly, prior to the Federal Death Act, the New Jersey death act
would have been applicable, for New Jersey has 'undoubted
power to impose an obligation upon a wrongdoer whose act,
although originating outside the state, has proximately caused
the infliction of a fatal injury within the state's territorial
waters."' If the New Jersey statute were applicable before the
Federal Act, Section 7 of the latter leaves the state act
undisturbed in its operation; yet pretty clearly Congress did
not contemplate a situation where both the federal and state
acts would apply, in which event there would be two distinct
obligations created, the satisfaction of one of which would not
extinguish the other. The "wrongful act," as used in Section 1,
might refer to the act of firing the gun or to the act of bringing
the decedent in contact with the shell. In considering the same
problem in connection with interstate railroads, where competing
state death acts may be involved, it was shown that any such
overlapping might be avoided by interpreting the acts as applying
only to cases where the fatal injury was received within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the state. If, as seems likely from the
somewhat meagre direct authorities, that view should prevail,
then in the case supposed the Federal Act would not apply; the
New Jersey act would be the only one applicable, the fatal injury
being received on the revenue cutter within the territorial waters
of New Jersey. Conversely, if a man puts a bomb on board an
American vessel in New York harbor, and the bomb explodes
after the vessel reaches the high seas beyond the marine league,
recovery for the ensuing deaths would be based on the Federal
Death Act, not on the state act.
In one respect the draftsmen of the Federal Act may seem to
have overlooked the possibility of the overlapping operation of
the federal and state acts. Prior to the enactment of the Fed-
eral Act, as already noted, it was recognized in The Hamilton'1
and The James McGee"3 that the state death acts might be
applied "extraterritorially" to cover deaths from fatal injuries
received on the high seas. Section 7 of the Federal Act broadly
provides "that the provisions of any state statute giving
or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be
affected by this act." At first blush it might seem that in a
case like The HamiltonW4 a libel might still be founded on the
"'z See supra note 35.
112 The Hamilton, supra note 36.
113 The James McGee, supra note 13.
114 The Hamilton, supra note 36.
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Delaware death statute, notwithstanding an alternative (or pos-
sibly cumulative) right of action under the Federal Act. Cer-
tainly Congress could never have foreseen any such result; and
no doubt Section 7 read in the light of the act as a whole and
its legislative history 11 will be construed as a saving clause to
maintain the efficacy of the state acts only in cases of fatal in-
juries received in localities not covered by the Federal Act; that
is, within the territorial waters of the states.
(c) Federal Death Act as Applied to Foreign Ships
Difficulties as to the application of the Federal Act may arise
when foreign ships are involved. If, as a result of a collision
on the high seas between a British and an American vessel,
lives are lost on the American vessel, suit would be brought
under the English death act. If lives were lost on the British
vessel, suit would be brought under the Federal Death Act be-
cause the initial act of negligence took place on board an Ameri-
can vessel. The reason for this result has already been discussed
in considering the extraterritorial application of state death acts.
The United States has no legislative competence to impose tort
obligations on a foreign ship or shipowner for the consequences
of a collision on the high seas. Hence, the wrongful act referred
to in Section 1 of the Federal Death Act must refer to the
original act of negligence, and not its result in bringing the fatal
force in contact with the victim.
From the foregoing it is apparent that the "wrongful act,
neglect or default" referred to in Section 1 of the Federal Act
must sometimes be taken to apply to the initial act of negligence
and sometimes to its result in bringing the fatal force in con-
tact with the victim. This is not surprising, because, as we
have seen, the state acts have received a similar construction;
and it is inevitable if effect is to be given to the predominant
purpose of Congress: 1. To so synchronize the Federal Act
with the state acts as to leave the state acts in exclusive and undis-
turbed operation, as theretofore, within state territorial waters,
and; 2. So far as the legislative jurisdiction of the United States
rightfully extends to events on the high seas, to leave no laciazae
wherein this kind of damage remains unrepaired.
If the collision occurs on the high seas between two vessels
of the same foreign nationality and lives are lost, recovery for
the deaths would depend upon the law of the nation to which
both ships belonged.'" The Federal Death Act would have no
application in such a case. Section 4 of that act is merely de-
315 See Hughes, op. cit. supra note 103.
116 See The Scotland, supra note 79.
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claratory of a principle of the conflict of laws already applied
in the case of the La Bourgogne.117
What if in a collision between a British and a French ship
on the high seas both vessels were at fault and lives were lost
on both vessels? From what has been said it would logically
follow that "the law of the respective flags would govern the
liability of each ship." 18 There seems no sound basis for ap-
plying the Federal Death Act in the case supposed."O The wide
terms of Section 1 which literally would apply to all cases of
wrongful death on the high seas should be confined to those cases
to which the legislative jurisdiction of the United States extends
under the ordinary principles of international law.
In view of what has been said, The Buenos Aires,120 a case
decided last year by the Circuit Court of Appeals, requires more
than passing notice. A collision occurred on the high seas be-
tween an American barque and a Spanish steamer due to the
negligence of the latter. The barque sank and several of its
crew lost their lives. Libels in rem were instituted against the
Spanish steamer by the administrators of the deceased seamen,
two of whom were drowned after jumping into the water from
the sinking barque and another of whom died from exposure
after having been picked up by the Spanish steamer. The libels
were founded on the Federal Death Act of March 30, 1920. It
was stipulated that under the Spanish law there existed a right
of action in favor of the relatives of the deceased who suffered
actual pecuniary damage, but that there was no right of action
in rem and no right of action in favor of an administrator. The
court held that the libels in rem were maintainable.
Considering what has been previously said in this article, there
are two "wrongful acts" to which Section 1 of the Federal
Death Act might conceivably apply: 1. The original negligent
act of navigation. The actor here was on a Spanish steamer on
the high seas. Surely, in an international sense the United
States has no legislative jurisdiction over that act so as to be
able to impose an obligation upon the actor. 2. The result of
such negligent act in the bringing of a fatal force in contact
with the victim. As to this operative fact, one difficulty with
applying the Federal Death Act is that the members of the
crew were not brought in contact with the fatal force on the
barque "part of the territory of the United States", but after
jumping from the barque into the water.12' Furthermore, as
117 La Bourgogne, supra note 7.
11s Hughes, op. cit. supra note 103.
19 But see supra note 79.
120 The Buenos Aires, supra note 100, affirming The Windrush, supra
note 100.
121 See supra note 83.
WRONGFUL" DEATH
was held in The Sagamore'22 and more recently in The Aqz2-
tania,123 the "law of the flag" of the innocent ship in a collision on
the high seas is not competent to impose a tort obligation upon
persons on the offending ship flying a foreign flag for the loss
of lives on the innocent ship. This problem has been considered
above in the discussion on the extra-territorial application of
state death acts. A fortiorl the law of the flag of the barque,
whose seamen were drowned, would not be competent to impose
a maritime lien upon the offending Spanish steamer. The mari-
time lien is a substantive property interest, not a mere matter
of procedure.12 4  The United States has no territorial jurisdic-
tion over a Spanish ship on the high seas and therefore cannot
create property interests therein.
What then, is the ground of the decision in The BueWs Aires?
The propositions laid down by the court are these:
1. That the nature and extent of libellants' rights "must be
determined according to the law of the place where the collision
occurred" i.e., the high seas.
2. That the lex loci is therefore the "general maritime law."
3. That this general maritime law is "only so far operative
as law in any country as it is adopted by the laws and usages
of that country."
4. That since the Federal Death Act of 1920 the maritime
law which the courts of the United States enforce gives a right
of action for wrongful death on the high seas.
The first two of the above propositions seem to be based on
a strictly territorial theory of law combined with a notion of
a truly international "over-law" applicable to the high seas."1 - ;
The last two of the above propositions obviously contradict the
first two; the final result is that the applicable law is not the
lex loci delictus at all, but the law of whatever forum in which
suit happens to be brought.
It must be admitted that responsibility for this confusion of
ideas must largely be ascribed to several often-quoted dicta of
the Supreme Court which, however, have been considerably quali-
fied by later expressions of the same tribunal.12
The decision in The Buemos Aires is all the more questionable
when the terms of Section 4 of the Federal Act are considered.
Admittedly, the Spanish law is competent to impose a liability
122 The Sagamoire, supra note 2.
12-- The Aquitania, supra note 84.
124 The Cuzco, supra note 94, and cases cited.
123 See supra note 79.
126 See supra note 79. See the significant words of Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the court in Cuba R. R. v. Crosby (1912) 222 U. S. 473, 478,
32 Sup. Ct. 132: "The language of .Mr. Justice Bradley in The Scotland
(1881) 105 U. S. 24, with regard to the application of the lex loci to a
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for wrongful death caused by negligent acts of those on board
the Spanish steamer on the high seas. Section 4 would therefore
clearly have allowed an action in personam by the next of kin
entitled to sue under the Spanish law.127  In fact, it is merely
declaratory of a principle of law already applied by the Supreme
Court in La Bourgogne28 ; and Congress, in Section 1 of the death
act hardly could have intended to create a cumulative right of
action for a wrongful death on the high seas in addition to that
already created by an appropriate application of foreign law.12
IV.
WRONGFUL DEATH OF SEAMEN
It has seemed to be in the interest of clearness to reserve for
separate treatment the matter of recovery for wrongful death
of seamen.
Apart from statute our courts recognized no right of action
under the "general maritime law." 130 In what circumstances
might the representatives of deceased seamen sue under the state
death acts? So far as concerned the death of a seaman on one
vessel resulting from the negligence of another vessel, no special
problem was presented. The applicability of the state death acts
to impose liability upon the offending vessel or its owners depended
upon principles already discussed.1 31 Likewise, the courts, prior
to the troublesome series of Supreme Court pronouncements be-
ginning with Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen 32 gave recovery
under state death acts to representatives of seamen suing in rem
the seaman's own ship, or in personam the owners thereof.13
case of collision between vessels belonging to different nations and so
subject to no common law, referred to that class of cases and no others,
and was used only in coming to the conclusion that foreign vessels might
take advantage of our limited liability act." (Italics ours.) See also
The Titanic (1914) 233 U. S. 718, 733, 34 Sup. Ct. 754, 756.
127 Accord: Powers v. Cunard S. S. Co. (S. D. N. Y.) 1925 A. M. C.
1047; The Aquitania, supra note 84.
128 La Bourgogne, supro note 7.
129 But see the contrary dictum in Powers v. Cunard S. S. Co., supra
note 127.
'1 Rainey v. New York & P. S. S. Co., supra note 93.
131 The Hamilton, supra note 36; Lewnan7 v. Hamburg-America S. S. Co.,
supra note 97; Chicago Transit Co. v. Campbell (1903) 110 Ill. App. 366.
In many of the cases already discussed in the text, the negligence of one
vessel happened to cause the death of seamen on another vessel. See,
for instance, The Sagamore, supra note 2, and The James McGeo, supra
note 13. See also The Onoko (1901, C. C. A. 7th) 107 Fed. 984; The Northern
Queen (1902, W. D. N. Y.) 117 Fed. 906; Trauffler v. Detroit & Cleveland
Nav. Co. (1910, W. D. N. Y.) 181 Fed. 256; The Oregon (1897, C. C. A.
9th) 81 Fed. 876; Humboldt Mfg. Assoc. v. Christopherson, supra note 97.
132 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra note 9.
133 Trauffler v. Detroit & Cleveland Nay. Co., supra note 131; The Trans-
fer No. 4 (1894, C. C. A. 2d) 61 Fed. 364; The Transfer No. 12 (1915,
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An interesting point in conflict of laws arose in Thompsoa
Towing Association v. McGregor.-4 In that case a seaman upon
a lighter was killed by an explosion upon its deck occurring
within the territorial waters of the Province of Ontario. The
home port of the lighter was in Michigan, where she was owned
and registered. Although by the Ontario death act the action
was barred by limitations, the court allowed a recovery under
the Michigan act upon the theory that "the intimate and mutually
dependent relation existing between a seaman and his ship" ,
concerned the "internal discipline" of the ship which by com-
mon agreement of nations was governed by the "law of the
flag," even though the ship were at the time in foreign territorial
waters. 3G This case was approved and followed in Patton-Tu fly
Trainportation Compaizy v. Tn,'ne;,'3 7 where the death act of
Tennessee, the state of the home port, was applied even though
the seaman met his death in Mississippi waters1s Although
this may seem a questionable exception to the general rule that
tort liability is determined by the law of the state within whose
territorial jurisdiction the alleged tortious act occurred,, 9 there
are practical considerations in its favor."'
C. C. A. 2d) 221 Fed. 409; Cornzell Stcambott Co. v. Fallon (1910, C.
C. A. 2d) 179 Fed. 293; The Clatzop Chief (1881, D. C. Or.) S Fed. 163;
McDonald v. Mallory (1879) 77 N. Y. 546; Souden v. Fore Rivcr Sip-
building Co., supra. note 46; Southern Pacific Co. v. Do Valle da Costa,
supra. note 73; Thompson Town2g Assoc. -e. McGregor, supra note 17;
Fisher v. Boutelle Transportation Co., supra note 93; The Highland Light
(1867) 12 Fed. Cas. No. 6477; Bjolstad v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., mipra
note 93; Grimsley v. Hankins (1891, S. D. Ala.) 46 Fed. 400. See also the
guarded remarks of Mr. Justice Holmes in The Hamilton, supra note 36,
at 406.
234 Thompson Towing Assoc. v. M1cGregor, szppra note 17.
135 Wenzler v. Robin Line S. S. Co. (1921, W. D. Wash.) 277 Fed. 812.
814.
136 One may indulge in the suspicion that had the facts been turned
around and the action under the Michigan act been barred by
limitation, the court would have applied the Ontario statute to give
relief.
137 Patton-Tully Transportation Co. v. Turner (1920, C. C. A. 0th) 269
Fed. 334.
238 See also Wenzler v. Robin Line S. S. Co., supra note 135; Gcraci v.
Cunard Co. (1923, Sup. Ct.) 120 Misc. 607, 200 N. Y. Supp. 132.
3 9 The lex loci rather than the "law of the flag" was thought to be ap-
plicable in Geoghegan v. Atlas S. S. Co., supra note 7; The Apurnac (E.
D. Va.) 1925 A. M. C. 604; The Navarho (E. D. N. Y.) 1925 A. M1. C.
1062. See also Rainey v. New York & P. . S. Co., sapra note 93; Dobrn
v. Mallory S. S. Co., supra note 11, at 352; The Hazna NTiclse- (1920, E.
D. N. Y.) 267 Fed. 729, and on appeal (1921) 273 Fed. 171; Gregory,
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Ships ia Territorial Watera (1904) 2 Miej. L.
REV. 333-357.
140 See Thompson Towing Assoc. v. McGregor, supra, note 17. See also
the general discussion in Hall, International Law, supra note 70, cc. S.
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In view of the doctrine elaborated in Southern Pacific Com-
pany v. Jensen,141  Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Com-
pany"12 and Knickerbocker Ice Compgny v. Stewart,14 3 it might
be supposed that the Supreme Court would regard the rules
governing the mutual rights and obligations of a seaman and his
ship as being such a "characteristic feature of the general mari-
time law" that the state death acts are incompetent to impose a
liability that did not exist in the maritime law.1 4' This point
was considered and rejected in Patton-Tully Transportation Com-
pany v. Turner 45 which allowed recovery under a state death
act; and although Western Fuel Company v. Garcia"40 involved
the d~ath of a stevedore, not a seaman, it is an arguable inference
from the opinion in that case that the earlier cases on the ap-
plication of state death acts to wrongful death of seamen are not
affected by the Jensen case and the cases following it. However
this may be, the question is now rendered academic by the Act
of Congress, the so-called Jones Act,17 which supersedes all
state death acts in respect of recovery for death of seamen oc-
casioned by wrongful act or neglect on the part of their own
vessels.
Reference has already been made to the Federal Death Act of
March 30, 1920118 covering wrongful deaths on the high seas
beyond state territorial waters. That act applied to seamen as
well as to others.14 1 As applied to seamen it has been superseded
to some extent by the Jones Act of June 5, 1920,1"° which provides:
"That any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course
of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for
damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such
action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending
the common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to
railway employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any
seaman as a result of any such personal injury the personal
representative of such seaman may maintain an action for dam-
ages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action
all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the
right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall
be applicable. Jurisdiction in such action shall be under the
14 1 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra note 9.
112 Ghelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., supra note 13.
143 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, supra note 10.
144 This is the inference drawn from these cases by Hughes, op cit. supra
note 103, at 122-123.
145 Patton-Tully Transportation Co. v. Turner, supra note 137.
146 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra note 10. See also Great Lakes
Dredge and Dock Co. v. Kierejewski, supra, note 10.
"-47 Act of June 5, 1920 (41 Stat. at L. 1007).
8 Supra note 63.
140 See The Swiftsure (1923, E. D. Va.) 286 Fed. 689; The Buenos Aires,
supra note 100.
150 Supra. note 147.
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court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or
in which his principal office is located." '"
The applicability of the Jones Act may be considered with ref-
erence to various situations:
1. Fatal injury of a seaman on a foreign vessel on the high
seas resulting from fault on the part of his own vessel. Although
literally the statute applies to any seaman killed in the courie
of his employment, this broad language must be given a construc-
tion in harmony with ordinary principles of international law.
The "law of the flag" would apply.
2. Fatal injury in navigable waters of the United States of
a seaman on a foreign vessel resulting from fault on the part
of his own vessel. In Stewart v. Pacific Steam Navigation Cowi-
pany-'2 it was held by Judge Learned Hand that the Jones Act
was applicable to such a situation. 3
3. Fatal injury of a seaman belonging to an American ves-
sel, on shore (e.g., on a dock) in a domestic port, while in the
course of his employment. As an original question it would seem
preferable that the liability of the ship or its owners for death
of its seamen in the course of their employment, which in all
other situations is governed by the Jones Act, should be deter-
mined by the same law when such seamen happen to be killed
on the dock. It can hardly be supposed that Congress intended
in this one fortuitous instance to deprive the seamen of the benefit
of the federal employers' liability acts. The Jones Act is broad
enough to cover such a case. Therefore, the sole question is one
of power. If Congress has the constitutional authority to legislate
with reference to the wrongful death of seamen on shore, the
Jones Act should be construed to cover the case. It is true that
151 For a discussion of the effect of this act on the death act of March 30,
1920, see Hughes, op. cit. supra note 103, at 124-125.
:
2 Stewart v. Pacific Steaw Nat. Co. (1924, S. D. N. Y.) 3 Fed. (2d) 329.
1 33It is suggested by Hughes, op. cit. spra note 103, at 126, that, "In
American waters within the marine league, the right of action would be
regulated by the local statute, for [the Jones Act] can not be construed
to apply to seamen on foreign ships; and therefore the state statute-
remain in force." If it is ultimately held by the Supreme Court, over-
ruling Stewart v. Pacific Stcanz Nav. Co., s2(pra note 152, that the Jones
Act does not apply to such a situation, it does not necessarily follow that
the state death acts would apply. As has already been pointed out in
the text, there is respectable authority for the proposition that under the
"internal discipline" theory, not the lc:e loci delict us, but the "Jaw of the
flag" governs the mutual rights and obligations of a seaman and hi
ship. See Thompson Towig Arsoc. v. McGregor, supw'a note 17, and
Patton-Tully Transportation Co. v. Trner, iSpra note 1'7. For this
reason it was held in The PiNar dd Rio (S. D. N. Y.) 1925 A. M. C. 1303,
where a seaman was injured on board a British ship in the port of
Philadelphia, that the English law, and not the Jones Act, determined the
rights and obligations of the parties.
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Congress's legislative power is limited to subject matter within
the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; and it is likewise true
that the jurisdiction of admiralty over torts is confined to those
committed upon navigable waters.6 These considerations have
influenced several courts to hold that the Jones Act does not apply
to a seaman injured while working on the dock.'" No decision
of the Supreme Court has yet come to hand. Is it not true that
the relation of the seaman to his ship and the mutual rights and
obligations resulting therefrom is a matter of admiralty cogni-
zance, and therefore a matter upon which Congress may legislate?
Could not a seaman injured on the dock in the service of the ship
sue in admiralty on his right to wages, maintenance and cure
given by the maritime law from ancient times? The writers
have been unable to find any suggestion to the contrary. If the
seamen were killed on a dock, an admiralty court, in the absence
of statute, would not entertain a libel for damages; but this
may have been because the "general maritime law" afforded no
remedy for wrongful death, and not because the subject matter
was non-maritime.
4. Fatal injury on navigable waters of the United States of
a seaman on a United States vessel as a result of fault on the
part of his own vessel. The Jones Act applies, superseding the
state death acts.," And this is true, even though the seaman
dies on shore. '
5. Fatal injury on the high seas of a seaman on a United
States vessel, as a result of fault on the part of his own vessel.
The Jones Act applies, superseding the Federal Death Act of
March 30, 1920.
6. Fatal injury of a seaman on a United States vessel in a
foreign port, as a result of fault on the part of his own vessel.
In Wenzler v. Robin Line Steamship Company, 1 18 where a sea-
man was killed on an American vessel in Havana harbor the
court held that the Jones Act was applicable, on the theory that
the "law of the flag," not the le= loci, governs this matter of "in-
ternal discipline." Other cases have reached the same re-
sult.15 9 Of course if the statute properly construed imposes a
liability on American ship-owners for death of seamen on Ameri-
154 See State Industrial Comm. v. Nordenholdt Co., supra note 20.
155 Hughes v. Alaska S. S. Co. (1923, W. D. Wash.) 287 Fed. 427; The
Edna (C. C. A. 9th) 1925 A. M. C. 849; The Covena (N. D. Calif.) 1925
A. M. C. 847.
156 See Hughes, op. cit. supra note 103, at 124. But see The Pioneer (C.
C. A. 3d) 1925 A. M. C. 591.
157 Campbell v. Luckenbach Steamship Co. (1925, D. C. Or.) 5 Fed. (2d)
674.
158 Wenzler v. Robin Line S. S. Co., supra note 135.
159 Bennett v. Connelly (1923, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 122 Misc. 149, 202 N.
Y. Supp. 568.
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can vessels, wheresoever occurring, even in a foreign port, an
American court has no option but to give effect to the will of
Congress.c o The power of Congress to that end is undoubted;
and it is reasonable to infer that Congress in the Jones Act in-
tended that so long as the seaman is aboard an American vessel
the obligations of the owner arising out of injuries to him
should be measured by one law, the "law of the flag," instead of
varying from port to port. But if this is so, it would seem
equally a fair inference that Congress did not intend the Jones
Act to apply to seamen on foreign ships dlled in American wa-
ters, although the power of Congress in this case is alzo un-
questioned. That is, the WTezzIc • case, if it is good law, casts a
doubt upon the correctness of the Stc2art case, cited in the
second category above.
7. It should be observed that the Jones Act applies only to
actions against the owner of the vessel on which the deceased
seaman was employed. It is an employer's liability act. Note
the specific reference to "the defendant employer." Therefore,
in all cases of wrongful death of seamen, occasioned through
fault on some other vessel, the situation remains the same as be-
fore the passage of the Jones Act. The deceased seaman's rep-
resentative in such case must found his action either (1) upon
some appropriate foreign law or (2) upon the Federal Death
Act of Mlarch 30, 1920 or (3) upon some state death act,161 in
accordance with principles already discussed in connection with
the wrongful death of persons other than seamen. Thus, sup-
pose a collision in New York harbor between two American
vessels, both at fault, resulting in the death of a seaman: the
Jones Act would govern the suit of the seaman's representative
against the seaman's employer, while the New York death act
would govern the action of the seaman's representative against
the other vessel or its owner.
Assuming that the Jones Act is applicable to a particular
case of the death of a seaman, there remains the question: in
what court or courts may suit be brought?
1. By the express terms of the statute suit may be brought
in the appropriate federal district court at common law; and
this, of course, irrespective of the presence or absence of di-
versity of citizenship.
2. A libel i& persoza.n may be maintained in admiralty in
view of the construction put upon the Jones Act by the Supreme
Court in Paiwwam Railroad Conpany v. Johnson.lG,-
160 If suit were brought in a foreign court, however, it would not be
surprising to find such court applying the lc:x locL
161 Beebe v. Uchida S. S. Co., supra note 11.
162 PalZaMa. R. R. v. Johson, sz'pra note 10, followed in Canmpbcel v.
Lz'ckenbach S. S. Co., supra note 157. The supposition that the act, unlez3
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3. No libel in rem can be entertained in the admiralty courts,
because no lien is given by the general maritime law in such
a case; the libellant's case is founded solely on the statute, which
does not confer a lien, but evidently confines the remedy to ac-
tions against the "defendant employer." 163
4. May an action be brought under the Jones Act in a state
court of common law? The difficulty arises over the provision
that:
"Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the
district in which the defendant employer resides or in which
his principal office is located."
It seems more reasonable to assume that Congress in this pro-
vision is merely conferring jurisdiction on the national courts,
and not by inference depriving state courts of their general
jurisdiction under the saving clause,"" to afford a concurrent
common law remedy for the violation of a right given by the
maritime law; and it has been so held.0 5
so construed, is unconstitutional in that it restricts the enforcement of
rights founded upon it "to actions at law, and thereby encroaches on the
admiralty jurisdiction intended by the Constitution" is certainly erroneous.
The jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts is entirely subject to the
matters. Although by the Constitution the judicial power of the United
States extends to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the
federal district courts'can exercise only so much of this power as Con-
gress extends to them. In like manner the judicial power of the United
States extends to all cases of diverse citizenship; but Congress could of
-course withdraw from the federal district courts their present original
jurisdiction in such cases, and leave them to be instituted in the state
courts alone.
103 Cf. the holdings under the state death acts, where the admiralty
courts decided that no libel in rem would lie unless the lien was expressly
conferred by the state statute. See supra note 28.
104 Judicial Code, sec. 24 (3).
'165 Engel v. Davenport (1924) 19A Calif. 344, 228 Pac. 710 (applying,
however, the state statute of limitations which provided a shorter period
than the period in the Jones Act); Patrone v. Howlett (1924) 237 N. Y.
394, 143 N. E. 232; Bennett v. Connelly, supra note 159. It was so assumed
in In Re East River Towing Col, Inc. (1924) 266 U. S. 355, 45 S Ip. Ct.
114, holding, however, that' the owner might in such a case file a petition
in admiralty for limited liability. On the general sukjeci of limitation
of liability as applied to statutory actions for -1'ongful death, see Butler
v. Boston Steamship Co. (1889) 130 U. S. 527, 9 Sup. Ct. 612; Carlisle
Pack. Co. v. Sandange& (1922) 259 I. S. 255, 42 Sup. Ct. 475; La Bour-
gogne, supra note 7. The latter case is now changed by the Federal Death
Act of March 30, 1920 (41 Stat. at L. 537) sec. 4. See also Benedict,
op. cit. supra note 105, secs. 142, 148, 474, 477. It has been held that
where action is brought in a state court it must, under the Jones Act,
be brought in the county in which the defendant resides or has his prin-
cipal place of business. Caceres v. Emergency Fleet Corp. (1924, E. D.
N. Y.) 299 Fed. 968; Wienbroer v. Emergency Fleet Corp. (1924, E. D.
N. Y.) 299 Fed. 972; Villaril v. Emergency Fleet Corp. (1924, E. D,
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A further question of statutory construction which has pro-
voked a contrariety of opinion that must ultimately be resolved
by the Supreme Court, is whether an action under the Jones
Act, begun in a state court, may be removed to the federal
courts. Some of the conflicting cases are cited in the note.11'3
N. Y.) 1 Fed. (2d) 570. Cf. Marti v. Luekcizbach S. S. Co. (1923, E. D.
N. Y.) 295 Fed. 569; Crawford v. Ocean Carriers Co. (1921, E. D.
N. Y.) A. M. C. 45; Atianza v. Emcrgcacy Fleet Corp. (1924, E. D.
N. Y.) 299 Fed. 975.
I,, No removal. Pettersoit r. Standard Oil Co. (S. D. N. Y.) 1924 A.
M. C. 1457; Reyes v. Eiwrgency Fleet Corp. (1921, E. D. N. Y.) 299 Fed.
957; Beor v. Clyde S. S. Co. (1923, S. D. N. Y.) 300 Fed. 561; Hcrrcra v.
Pan-America Petrolemn & Transp. Co. (1924, S. D. N. Y.) 300 Fed. 563
(action for personal injuries). Removal. (All cases of suit for personal
injury) Wenzler v. Robin Line S. S. Co., supra note 135; Lorang v.
Alaska S. S. Co. (1924, W. D. Wash.) 298 Fed. 547; Malia v. Soutkhr
Pac. Co. (1923, E. D. N. Y.) 293 Fed. 902; Petterson r. Hobbs, W'all & Co.
(1923, N. D. Calif.) 300 Fed. 811.
